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LENDER RECOURSE IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
A NAVAJO CASE STUDY
PAUL E. FRYE*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article analyzes lender recourse issues which are significant in the
evaluation of investment and lending decisions within the Navajo Nation.
Initial research for this article was done under a contract with the Council
of Energy Resource Tribes ("CERT").' After examining the structure of
the Navajo government, characterized as "probably the most elaborate
among tribes," 2 this article discusses the applicable substantive law, pro-
cedures, and remedies. In addition, this article analyzes lender perceptions
of consistency, competence, and fairness of the Navajo judiciary, and it
treats the concerns of some commentators regarding Indian court systems
generally.
This article integrates the results of interviews with attorneys for lenders
and consumers, literature searches, legal analysis, and the observations
of the writer from fourteen years of practice within the Navajo Nation.
In light of the rapid pace of development of commercial law in the
Navajo Nation, periodic follow-up research is plainly warranted.
Because of the complexity of the Navajo government, and because
lenders may be unfamiliar with or suspicious of Navajo institutions and
decisionmaking processes, this article first describes the Navajo govern-
mental structure. Analysis of the substantive law is preceded by an
overview of traditional attitudes of Navajos regarding personal indebt-
edness. These attitudes are useful not only in evaluating generalizations
made about Navajo borrowers, but also in predicting, to some extent,
the attitudes of Navajo judges in civil actions brought by creditors.
Indeed, the choice of law provision of the Navajo Tribal Code requires
consideration of Navajo traditional law, and-while no true traditional
law will be applicable or provable in most actions brought by creditors-
both the Navajo Nation Council and the judges are sensitive to the
* Partner, Nordhaus, Haltom, Taylor, Taradash & Frye; J.D. 1977, Harvard.
1. The writer expresses his appreciation to CERT and its counsel, Mervyn L. Tano, for their
support and input, and to Lisa M. Enfield for her comprehensive review of this article.
2. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 201 (1985) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 78, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 8 (1969)). The value of this complexity is certainly debatable.
See Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 231-32 (1989);
Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing
the White Man's Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 281-289 (1986).
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desirability of retaining Navajo traditions even as non-Indian legal con-
cepts are integrated into the Navajo system.'
After a discussion of the applicable substantive law of the Navajo
Nation, the procedures promulgated by the Navajo judiciary are analyzed
and remedies are evaluated. Finally, this article describes in some detail
non-Indians' perceptions of the fairness and consistency of the Navajo
judiciary and analyzes these perceptions and concerns with reference to
reported decisions.
In summary, the Navajo Nation has for several years taken significant
steps to improve the climate for those seeking to do business within
Navajo Indian Country. The most recently elected administrations have
emphasized the need to develop Navajo small businesses-ones not de-
pendent on government subsidies for their success. Concomitantly, the
Navajo Nation has sought to strengthen its sovereign interests in assuring
that commercial development is accomplished in a manner consistent with
Navajo needs, expectations, and interests, and in regulating of excluding
those entities whose practices do not comport with the policies established
by the Navajo Nation Council.
Studies conducted by the Council of Energy Resource Tribes show an
unmet demand for lending to credit-worthy small businesses and persons
within the Navajo Nation. The existing credit programs, administered by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs or initiated by the Navajo government in
Window Rock, are failures because of administrative neglect, lack of
either business acumen of the borrowers or technical assistance from the
lenders (or both), andthe intrusion of political considerations into lending
decisions. New institutions are certainly called for, and the Navajo gov-
ernment, at all levels, is creating a favorable environment for the creation
and operation of institutions capable of taking advantage of this envi-
ronment.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE NAVAJO GOVERNMENTAL
STRUCTURE
A. Historical and Geographical Setting
The Navajo Nation now encompasses an area of about seventeen million
acres. The Tribe is the most populous of any Indian tribe in North
America, and the land base held in trust for the Tribe as a whole is
larger than eight of the states of the Union.
Although almost all of the Arizona and Utah portions of the Navajo
Nation is held in trust for the Tribe as a whole, the situation is different
3. For a recent example, see the Preamble to the Navajo Nation Corporation Code, passed
on January 30, 1986, at 2:
The interpretation of this code should be based on Navajo Tribal Court interpretation
and such interpretation shall give the utmost respect in deciding the meaning and
purpose of this code to the unique traditions and customs of the Navajo People.
General decisional law interpreting similar provisions of the above Model Acts and
state agricultural cooperative acts may be used as guidance.
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in the eastern part of the New Mexico portion of the Navajo Nation.
In New Mexico lie not only 1,572,710 acres of the original treaty reservation 4
and 829,600 acres of tribal trust reservation,5 but also the New Mexico
portion of the reservation created by executive orders in 1907 and 1908
("E.O. 709/744 reservation"). 6 In 1908, the E.O. 709/744 reservation
was opened to non-Indian settlement. This area, called the "Pueblo Bonito
subdivision of the Navajo reservation" in appropriations acts from 1919-
1927, is now administered by the Eastern Navajo Agency of the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"), which also has jurisdiction
over other "checkerboard" lands in New Mexico. 7
It is somewhat peculiar that only the New Mexico portion of the
Navajo Nation is characterized by checkerboard land ownership because
this area is the "Dinetah," or Navajo homeland. Navajo origins are
traced in Navajo tradition to Fajada Butte, near Pueblo Bonito in Chaco
Canyon, and Huerfano Peak, in the Eastern Navajo Agency north of
the E.O. 709/744 boundary.
Historically, the political organization of the Navajo people centered
around "Naat'a'anii," or local headmen.
From the legends we can learn something of the social and economic
life of the [Navajo] People, including their political organization, at
the time they lived in Dine'tah more than 500 years ago.
4. This area was conferred by the Treaty with the Navajo Indians, Aug. 12, 1868, United
States-Navajo, 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
5. Established by the Executive Order of January 6, 1880. ExEcUTIVE ORDERS RELATiNG TO
INDIAN RESERVES 56 (1890).
6. Executive Order Nos. 709, 744 (dated Nov. 9, 1907 and Jan. 28, 1908, respectively) [hereinafter
E.O. 709/744 reservation]. This part of the reservation was opened pursuant to section 25 of the
Act of May 29, 1908. 35 Stat. 444, 457 (1908).
7. The boundaries of the New Mexico portion of the E.O. 709/744 reservation contain ap-
proximately 1.9 million acres. Approximately 95% of the population in this area is American Indian,
according to the 1990 census. About 55% of the land in the E.O. 709/744 area is Indian-owned
and another 21% is United States Bureau of Land Management land administered by the Navajo
Tribe under a cooperative agreement with the BLM and the BIA.
In resolving conflicting decisions of two district court judges, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that the E.O. 709/744 reservation in New Mexico was diminished as a
result of the opening of the area to non-Indian settlement. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co.
v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990). The Navajo suggestion
for rehearing en banc was denied by an evenly divided court of appeals, with two judges not
participating.
In the remainder of the "checkerboard" lands administered by the Eastern Navajo Agency, about
88% of the population is Indian, according to the 1990 census, and 83% of the land is Indian-
owned or administered. See Sandoval v. Tinian, Inc., 5 Navajo Rptr. 215 (Window Rock D. Ct.
1986) (regarding demographics of Torreon Chapter in Eastern Navajo Agency). That Navajo ownership
of land in Arizona is generally confluent with Arizona reservation boundaries, while the New Mexico
portion of the Navajo Nation is not, is a result of the political power of perhaps a half dozen
non-Indian ranchers who succeeded in opening the E.O. 709/744 reservation in New Mexico, as
well as the unfortunate by-product of an unrelated dispute between Senator Chavez of New Mexico
and John Collier, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, when land consolidation and boundary bills
were being considered by Congress in the 1930's. See D. PARKAN, Tre NAvjos AND THE NEW
DEAL 132-59 (1976).
The jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation over actions arising in the Eastern Navajo Agency is likely
to be the subject of substantial litigation. In Sandoval, the court held that it had both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant doing business in the checkerboard
area, finding that the area in question was a "dependent Indian community" and part of Navajo
Indian Country. 5 Navajo Rptr. at 220.
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In these traditional accounts we find recurrent references to Chiefs
(Naat'a'anii) and democratic gatherings (Councils) as media for de-
cision-making and group control. (At this early period the group
involved seems to have been the clan.) The Chiefs talked to the people,
advised them and gave them guidance, and when problems arose or
danger threatened the Chiefs might call a Council to decide upon a
course of action. The Chiefs of legendary times were much like the
Headmen (Naat'a'anii) of a more recent period, to judge by their
function; and, like the more modern Headmen, the Naat'a'anii of
the distant past could be deposed or forced to resign for cause. A
Headman remained a leader so long as his leadership enlisted public
confidence or resulted in public benefit. Clearly, the concept of dem-
ocratic government was not absent in Navajo life of long ago, although
the unit involved-whether the clan or a local community group-
was far smaller than the entire Tribe.
The legends, the recollections of the aged, and the written accounts
that have come down to us from Spanish and Anglo-American ob-
servers over the past two centuries all point to the Navajo Tribe of
former times as a group of people sharing a common language and
a common way of life, but not as a political entity organized under
centralized leadership for a common purpose. The emergence of the
Tribe as a nation, in a political sense, has come only in very recent
times.I
With respect to the Navajo economy, it has only been in recent years
that any significant departure from the traditional pastoral and agricultural
lifestyle has taken place. This is the result of a variety of factors, including
the relative success and industry of Navajos in the traditional economic
pursuits. However, the pursuit of traditional means of support has been
determined, in large measure, by a lack of viable alternatives. The state
and federal governments have historically ignored the infrastructure needs
of Navajo Indian Country, and lack of roads, 9 electricity,' 0 running
water," and health facilities 2 are only a few of the disincentives for
industry to come to Navajo Country and create jobs. The businesses
which do come to Navajo Indian Country do so often because they have
no viable alternative-one cannot extract Navajo coal or petroleum prod-
ucts from Phoenix or Albuquerque.
8. R. YOUNG, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE NAVAJO TRIBE 15-16 (1978).
9. In 1975, it was reported that Navajo Indian Country had 60 miles of paved roads per 1,000
square miles, compared with 154 miles in comparable rural areas of the Southwest. UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE NAVAJO NATION: AN AMERICAN COLONY 41 (1975) [hereinafter
THE NAVAJO NATION]. A 1982 study performed for the Navajo Nation shows this disparity to be
increasing, and found further that there were 25 times the miles of unpaved but improved roads
in areas outside of Navajo Indian Country as in comparable areas within. MOUNTAIN WEST RESEARCH
AND APPLIED ECONOMICS, ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND FACILITIES: NAVAiO NATION AND SELECTED
SAMPLE COUNTIS 40-41 (1982).
10. See Back & Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug on the Colorado River?, 20
NAT. RESOURCES J. 71, 74 (1980): "Still, about 90 percent of the homes on the reservation are
without electricity, compared to only one percent nationwide .... "
11. The Commission on Civil Rights found that 8.4% of Navajo homes had standard inside
plumbing, compared with 81.8% nationwide. THE NAVAJO NATION, supra note 9, at 41.
12. "Health care on the reservation is not only inadequate, it is unsafe." Id. at 128.
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The most critical determinant of the current lack of a modern economic
infrastructure in Navajo Indian Country is the lack of education of adult
Navajos. In article VI of the 1868 Treaty with the Navajos, the United
States agreed to provide a school and teacher wherever thirty children
could be induced to attend school. 3 The Navajos, a people often char-
acterized as adept at integrating non-Navajo values into Navajo ways,
sought compliance with the Treaty terms, but congressional debates in 1894
noted that the United States had "defaulted' '1 4 on its obligations and
that "[iln other cases, like that of the Navajoe [sic] tribe, with 3,000
children, they have only one school '."' 5
The situation was little better in March of 1948 when a Department
of Interior report stated the following:
In its Treaty of 1868 with the Navajo Tribe, the United States
agreed to provide a school house and teacher for each thirty Navajo
children. Yet today there are 24,000 Navajo children of school age
(6 to 18 years) with total school facilities available for not more than
7,000.
The educational status of the present Navajo population may be
summarized as follows: more than 66 percent have had no schooling
whatever, while the median number of school years for the group as
a whole is less than one.' 6
By 1980, census statistics indicated that the median education level for
adult Navajos had risen to fifth grade. Apparently content with this
advancement, the Reagan administration began closing schools on the
Navajo reservation. The school districts of the states purport to encompass
all lands within Navajo Indian Country, yet according to the Assistant
Supervisor of the Gallup Public Schools, the state schools are not able
to educate many Navajos because: (1) state schools have no four-wheel
drive vehicles to pick up students (and have no plans to obtain such
vehicles); and (2) the roads in Navajo Indian Country are so bad that
four-wheel drive vehicles are required to get Navajo children to and from
schools. Almost poetically, the areas of historical neglect of Navajos
reinforce each other. '7
To provide for its own infrastructure, the Navajo Nation has recently
begun implementation of its tax program, after the Supreme Court de-
13. Treaty with Navajo Indians, Aug. 12, 1868, United States-Navajo, art. VI, 15 Stat. 667,
669 (1868).
14. 26 CoNG. REC. 7703 (1894) (reproducing the report of Special Agent Donaldson).
15. Id. at 5926.
16. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON THE NAVAJO, LONG RANGE PROGRAM
oF NAVAJO REHABILITATION 11 (1948) (available at University of New Mexico Law Library, call no.
IND-E-99-N3U55).
17. See Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 834 (1982), referring
to the "tribal children abandoned by the State [of New Mexico]." The worst discrimination in the
United States against Indian children by public schools was found in the checkerboard area in New
Mexico. NAACP & HARvARD CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUCATION, AN EVEN CHANCE: A REPORT
ON FEDERAL FUNDs FOR INDIAN CHILDREN IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DIsTRICTs 7 (1971); see also Natonabah
v. Board of Educ. of Gallup-McKinley County School Dist., 355 F. Supp. 716, 719 (D.N.M. 1973).
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termined that its tax ordinances need not be approved by the Secretary
of the Interior." Tribal taxes on petroleum production will decrease with
the decrease in recoverable Navajo reserves and will fluctuate with world
pricing. Major coal producers and power plants on the reservation have
obtained yet-to-be-tested tax waivers on their activities. Thus, Navajo
taxing authority will be able to meet some, but by no means all, of the
infrastructure needs in Navajo Indian Country.' 9 It should be expected,
therefore, that investment and development in the near term will con-
centrate in areas where some infrastructure is already in place, primarily
in the communities of Crownpoint, Window Rock, Shiprock, Chinle,
Tuba City, Churchrock, and Kayenta.
B. The Origins of the Modern Navajo Government
The Navajo government was established, and to some extent continues
to operate, in an environment of divergent expectations, needs, and goals.
The Department of the Interior, by regulations promulgated on January
7, 1923, created a Navajo Tribal Council of one Chairman, one Vice-
Chairman, and six members. 20 The Secretary of the Interior retained the
power to remove any member of the Council "upon proper cause shown. ' 21
In 1928, the Hopi Reservation was officially represented in the Navajo
Tribal Council.Y
The initial regulations did not set out the scope of authority of the
Council, nor did later amendments to the regulations.23 Revisions were
sought during the 1930s to allow the Tribe "greater responsibility of the
management of its own affairs, acting for this purpose through its
representative Tribal Council." ' A Committee for Council Reorganiza-
tion, composed of Council members, was formed around 1930.25 Other
committees, including the forerunner of the powerful Advisory Committee,
were established by Chairman Dodge.2
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier sought to strengthen the
Council in 1933, and the Council responded by rescinding the 1923
resolution which gave the Secretary of the Interior a "power of attorney"
18. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
19. A 3.8 billion dollar infrastructure investment was needed in 1975 to bring Navajo Indian
Country to parity with the surrounding areas. Tn NAvAJO NATiON, supra note 9, at 42.
20. The federal government created the Tribal Council in order to establish an ostensibly
representative body to ratify mineral leases on Navajo land. R. YoUNo, THE NAvAJO YEARBOOK:
1951-1961 A DECADE OF PROGass 373-75 (1961). In 1936, by resolution, the Council stated "that
the sole purpose for creation of the 1923 Council was the making of oil and gas leases." R. YOUNG,
supra note 8, at 90.
21. R. YoUmo, supra note 8, at 60.
22. Id. at 70.
23. Id. at 68-69.
24. Id. at 69.
25. Id. at 76.
26. Id. at 76, 130-131. The Advisory Committee was redesignated as the Intergovernmental
Relations Committee in the extensive revisions to the Navajo Tribal Code. Resolution CD-68-89
(Dec. 15, 1989). Of the various committees of the Navajo Nation Council, the Advisory Committee
has had the most delegated authority. See NAvAJo Tam. CODE tit. 2, §§ 341-44 (Supp. 1985). Under
the revised government structure, the Intergovernmental Relations Committee continues to hold the
most power.
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to enter into leases for the Tribe.27 In 1936, the Council determined that
its authority was inadequate and established a committee with respon-
sibility for calling a constitutional assembly. From this assembly came
a greater number of representatives and bylaws, which, although no
constitution was approved, served as a great step away from the earlier
restrictive regulations and toward self-government.2 "Rules for the Navajo
Council," containing many of the provisions of the Navajo bylaws, were
approved by Secretary Ickes on July 26, 1938, and these Rules "remain
the foundation upon which the modern Navajo Tribal Council rests." 29
Major revisions to the 1938 Rules came in 1951 and 1955, when federal
involvement in tribal elections was all but eliminated. In 1958, the election
procedures were revised to provide for appointment, rather than election,
of judges.30 The number of Council delegates has increased from six in
1923, to twelve in 1928, to twenty-four in 1934, to seventy-four (in the
bylaws) in 1937, to the present eighty-eight in 1979.11
The growth of a national Navajo government was accompanied by the
establishment of local governments, called "Chapters." These are also
BIA innovations. This "local political structure ... bears striking re-
semblance to the New England town meeting of the 17th and 18th
centuries." ' 32 In 1955, the Navajo Tribal Council recognized eighty-six
Chapters throughout Navajo Indian Country.3 3 By 1970, there were ninety-
six, 34 and the number of Chapters is now 108. The system came into
disrepute among some Navajos during the traumatic stock reduction era,
when the Chapter Houses were used as centers of operations for those
in charge of reducing the number of Navajo sheep. 35 Recently, though,
Chapters have been delegated authority to pass "local ordinances on any
matter affecting the community," ' subject to the approval of the Navajo
Tribal Council and its Intergovernmental Relations Committee.
Williams properly notes the non-Indian origins of the current Navajo
political structure.37 He-again properly-also cautions against assigning
non-Indian content or meaning to such structures. 38 Traditional decision-
making has not been supplanted by Anglo-inspired forms, as an early
example illustrates.
27. R. YouNo, supra note 8, at 78-79.
28. Id. at 107.
29. Id. at 114.
30. Id. at 148.
31. See NAVAJO TRIn. CODE tit. 2, § 4001(d) (Supp. 1985).
32. A. WnLmi, NAVAJO PouLmcAL PiocFss 1 (1970). For an account of a typical Chapter
meeting, see id. at 43.
33. R. YouNo, supra note 8, at 154.
34. A. WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 154.
35. Id. at 38.
36. NAVAJO TRIm. CODE tit. 2, § 4002 (Supp. 1985).
37. A. W.LIAMS, supra note 32, at 53; accord THE NAVAJO NATION, supra note 9, at 19 (Navajo
government is "structured on Anglo, not Indian concepts"). Williams, however, attributes the relative
success of the Chapter system to its use of "preexisting patterns of political selection and social
control in the operations of chapters." A. WntI.1AMs, supra note 32, at 62.
38. A. W.mLiA, supra note 32, at 53.
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In 1920, the Indian Agent Stacher for the Crownpoint area felt
that his program suffered from a lack of centralized leadership among
the Navajos. He requested that a meeting be called to elect a leader
of the Navajo people, so that the Government program could be
pushed by this elected leader.
The meeting took place at Charley Jim's, while a Yeibichai dance
was underway. . . . Three men were nominated. The first was Cas-
amero Tsinajinni, the second was Chief Becenti, and the third was
Atsidi Yazzi Biye'. These three men all gave a talk, and the vote
was taken in the following manner. The people who were in favor
of Chief Becenti were asked to go over and stand near him, and the
ones favoring the other two were to go and stand near them. Two
of the nominated men had what seemed like an equal number of
voters standing near them, and one man had but a few people standing
near him.
It was decided to count the fewer men around Atsidi Yazzi Biye'
first, and the number was 50. Next, Stacher counted those people
around Chief Becenti, then the people around Casamero Tsinajinni.
The count was Becenti 333 votes, and Casamero Tsinajinni got 330
votes, thus Becenti was elected as chief or headman for the people
around Crownpoint by 3 votes. This was how we did things then.
However, it did not change things very much as we still went to our
regular leaders and did what they suggested, just as we did before
Stacher had the vote, but I guess Stacher felt better.3 9
The most significant difference in the meaning of Navajo political
thought is the value attached to a dissenting minority. Failure to recognize
the centrality of consensus in Navajo political behavior would be a serious
oversight in the establishment of any major economic institution or
program in Navajo Indian Country. As Williams states:
I believe that the interdependent functions of withdrawal and consensus
characterize most, if not all, contemporary Navajo sociopolitical struc-
tures.
A major emphasis of all Navajo social interaction is to achieve
harmony, and the well-being of individuals is coextensive with that
of the group .... Harmonious interpersonal relations are thus the
primary objective of action, and consensus is the direct evidence that
a group has reached its goal. Consensus among the Navajos is not
so much an agreement on all issues as it is the pattern of discussion,
debate, negotiation, and compromise, and the respect for attitudes
of indifference among members of its group whose primary aim is
to maintain a sense of identification with each other as participants
in the Navajo culture. The act of withdrawing from a social or
political gathering by individuals is behavior prompted by considerable
social pressure for consensus and harmony which, in turn, is valued
by Navajos as the greatest good in the universe. 40
39. Id. at 34 (citing a 1962 interview).
40. Id. (citation omitted).
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The value attached to spirited debate is quite different in the Navajo
tradition, as evidenced by the following narration, reproduced in Williams'
book4' and describing reactions to meetings which concerned the dev-
astating stock reductions:
MEETINGS
For long time
there have been meetings
of many men
for many days.
At the meetings
there is talking
talking,
talking.
Some this way,
some that way.
In the morning
when my father
leaves for meeting
he says to us,
"When I come here again
then I will know
if it be best
to have many sheep
or a few sheep,
to use the land
or let it sleep."
But
when my father
comes home from meeting
he does not know
which talking way to follow.
Tonight
when my father
came home from meeting
he just sat looking
and looking.
Then my mother
spoke to me.
She said
"A meeting is like rain.
When there is little talk
now and then,
here and there,
it is good.
It makes thoughts grow as
little rain makes corn grow.
But big talk, too much,
is like a flood
taking things of long
standing before it."
My mother
said this to me,
but I think
she wanted my father
to hear it.
Author: Anonymous Navajo
The non-Indian model of the Council and Chapter system is repeated
in the. Navajo Nation courts. The Navajo judiciary reflects a similar
tension between Navajo tradition and Navajo perceptions of what is
needed for acceptance of its authority to adjudicate disputes regarding
economic activities within the Navajo Nation.
The reason for the adoption by the Navajo Tribal Council of an Anglo-
style judiciary has been alluded to by the Court of Appeals of the Navajo
Nation in In re Battles, where the court stated: "The Navajo Tribal
Council was afraid of state jurisdiction and a state takeover, and it did
wish to reinforce Navajo sovereignty .... The new court system was
created to avoid the systems of others, and a legal system designed on
state and federal models was the result." 42 The court cited an article by
41. Id. at v.
42. 3 Navajo Rptr. 92, 95 (1982) (citations omitted). At the time of the Battles decision, the
court of appeals was the highest court in the Navajo judicial system. The recent reorganization of
the Navajo judiciary has replaced the former court of appeals with the Navajo Supreme Court.
See infra text accompanying notes 58-69. The Battles case, concerning among other things whether
"professional attorneys" were barred from practicing in the Navajo Tribal Courts, has antecedents
in both federal law and the law of other tribes. See section 8 of Law and Order Regulations,
approved by the Secretary of the Interior on November 27, 1935, reproduced in Tribal Power-
Exclusion of Non-Indian Attorneys, I Op. Sol. 775 (1937). The past Chairman of the Navajo Tribal
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Stephen Conn.4 In it, Conn opines that the legal system was designed,
at least in part, to prove to both Navajos and non-Navajos that a
"centralized tribal government could be trusted to govern."" Laurence
Davis, an attorney assisting then-general counsel Norman Littell, wrote
of the transition from the BIA-initiated Court of Indian Offenses to the
independent Navajo judiciary of the late 1950's, concluding that the
assumption by the Navajo Nation of "complete and exclusive responsibility
for its own judiciary . .. is clearly one of the greatest accomplishments
of Indian self-government in this century.'"'4
The relevant Tribal Council resolutions establishing the reformed Navajo
judiciary have been codified in title 7 of the Navajo Tribal Code. Only
recently have any significant amendments been enacted. The territorial
jurisdiction provision was revised in 1985 to define more generally the
geographical reach of the judicial power.4 More importantly, the widely
mistrusted (but almost completely idle) "Supreme Judicial Council," an
arm of the Tribal Council which had been delegated the ability to review
decisions of the court of appeals which invalidated Council resolutions,
was abolished in 1985 in the same resolution which established an ap-
pointed Navajo Supreme Court, whose judges sit during good behavior.4 7
The tension between preservation of the traditional (and, by all accounts,
successful) means of ordering social relations, and the dictates of inter-
actions with non-Indian economic and political institutions, is apparent
in each of the major issues discussed below. While many believe that
the adoption of Anglo models of dispute resolution are fundamentally
inimical to preservation of tradition, at least one respected authority does
not." At any rate, it does appear to be true that "[tihe greatest challenge
faced by the modern tribal court system is in the harmonizing of past
Indian customs and traditions with the dictates of contemporary juris-
prudence." 49
Council and the current President of the Navajo Nation, Peterson Zah, once said: "I am not a
lawyer. Some people have urged that I should go to law school and become a lawyer, but after
working for those lawyers in the last ten years, I am better off the way I am." AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW TRAININo PROGRAM, JUSTICE N IN AN COUNTRY 107 (1980) [hereinafter JUSTICE N INDIAN
CoUNTRY].
43. Conn, Mid-Passage-The Navajo Tribe and its First Legal Revolution, 6 AM. INDIAN L.
Rv. 329 (1978).
44. Id. at 340-46.
45. Davis, Court Reform in the Navajo Nation, 43 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 53, 55 (1959).
46. Compare NAv o Tam. CODE tit. 7, § 254 (1978) with NAv~o Tim. CODE tit. 7, § 254, as
amended on July 25, 1985. The 1985 provision states:
The territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation shall extend to Navajo Indian
country, defined as all land within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Indian
Reservation or of the Eastern Navajo Agency, all land within the limits of dependent
Navajo Indian communities, all Navajo Indian allotments, and all other land held
in trust for, owned in fee by, or leased by the United States to, the Navajo Tribe
or any Band of Navajo Indians.
47. Navajo Nation Judicial Reform Act of 1985, Resolution No. CD-94-85 (Dec. 4, 1985).
48. See V. DELORIA & C. LYnE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 136-37 (1983).
49. Id. at 120. See generally JuICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAvAJO NATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1-5
(1988).
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This historical tension between the goal of preserving customs and
traditions, while establishing institutions and practices to satisfy non-
Indian standards, is a theme repeated in many variations in the discussion
which follows.
C. The Lack of a Constitution
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ("IRA") contained provisions
to encourage Indian tribes to adopt constitutions. The BIA often drafted
constitutions for the tribes, and standard provisions of these BIA con-
stitutions, contrary to the intent of the IRA to foster self-determination,
included the submission of tribal laws for Secretarial approval or dis-
approval.
The Navajo Tribe rejected the opportunity to become an IRA tribe
in an election held on June 17, 1935, by a vote of 7,992 to 7,608.50 The
reason for the rejection was a reaction to a perceived continuation of
federal intrusion: opponents of the IRA equated the adoption of IRA
provisions with stock reduction carried out, often brutally, by federal
officials during that time. A constitutional assembly was convened in
April of 1937. In 1950, Congress included in the Navajo-Hopi Rehabil-
itation Act of 1950Y' authority for the Navajo people to adopt a con-
stitution.52 As late as 1968, the Navajo Tribal Council adopted a resolution
calling for the submission of a constitution to the Navajo people.53 Support
for a Navajo constitution was renewed and strengthened as a result of
the placing by the Council of former Chairman Peter MacDonald on
"administrative leave" after allegations of misuse of power were made
before a congressional subcommittee in 1988.
Non-Indian entities have argued that, because of the origins of the
Council, because of the lack of a constitution, and because of the principle
that a sovereign governs only by the consent of the governed, the re-
solutions of the Council have no legal effect.Y
The Solicitor General viewed the contention that a constitution was
necessary for Council actions to be valid as follows:
Only the most insular perspective would view a governmental body
as lacking legitimacy or plenary authority merely because its pedigree
is not traced to a popular constitutional convention and its powers
are not defined by an entrenched constitution. One need only consider
the British Parliament, which, from year to year, defines its own
authority and evolved from a council of royal appointees. The first
50. R. YOUNG, supra note 8, at 377.
51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 631 to 640c-3 (1988).
52. Id. § 636.
53. Minutes of Sessions of the Navajo Tribal Council, Nov. 14, 1968. With regard to the various
attempts to impose a constitutional structure on the Navajo, see generally R. YOUNG, supra note
8, at 114, 128-29, 148-49; Conn, supra note 43, at 336.
54. These arguments have been made most forcefully by corporations seeking to invalidate the
Navajo tax code. Ironically, these corporations based their right to extract minerals from, and to
do business on, the Navajo Reservation on Tribal Council resolutions approving leases of tribal
lands.
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principle of sovereignty, after all, is that the form of government is
a matter for self-determination. 5
Noting that a much greater percentage of eligible Navajos vote in tribal
elections than do non-Indians in state and federal elections, the Supreme
Court dealt with the non-Indians' arguments rather succinctly, stating
that "[t]he legitimacy of the Navajo Tribal Council, the freely elected
governing body of the Navajos, is beyond question." 56 The lack of an
IRA constitution does not detract from the Council's legitimacy or its
power over members and non-members alike.57
D. Separation of Powers
Prior to the 1985 Judicial Reform Act, the Navajo Tribal Courts, like
most tribal courts, 58 were subordinate to the Tribal Council. 59
Unlike many Indian judicial systems, however, the Navajo Nation has
customarily adhered to the principle of separation of powers, 60 and the
Navajo courts have ruled on the validity of Tribal Council actions1.6 The
independence* of the Navajo judiciary is illustrated by, for example,
Howard Dana & Associates v. Navajo Housing Authority0 (affirming a
judgment of $104,864 against the Navajo Housing Authority), George
v. Navajo Tribe63 (holding that, contrary to Navajo Tribal Code title 7,
section 653, non-Indians were eligible to serve as jurors in tribal courts),
Halona v. MacDonald" (affirming an injunction prohibiting the Chairman
and tribal comptroller from expending funds appropriated by the Tribal
Council to pay for the Chairman's legal expenses), and Yazzie v. Board
of Election Supervisors65 (rejecting an apportionment plan adopted by
the Council).
That the judicial branch may have been formally subordinate to the
legislative branch was not necessarily inappropriate. "The first element
of sovereignty, and the last which may survive successive statutory lim-
itations of Indian tribal power, is the power of the tribe to determine
and define its own form of government."" Again, one need look only
55. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25, Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
56. Kerr-McGee Corp., 471 U.S. at 201 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 198-99.
58. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW TRAININ PROGRAM, INIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE ROLE
OF TRmAL COURTS 37 (1977) ("as a general rule these courts are not empowered to review the
validity of council actions or enactments . .. ").
59. R. YOUNG, supra note 8, at 160; see Badonie v. Donaldson, 1 Navajo Rptr. 73, 75 (1973).
60. Badonie, I Navajo Rptr. at 74.
61. Halona v. MacDonald, I Navajo Rptr. 189, 203-04 (1978); see also infra notes 338-54 and
accompanying text.
62. 1 Navajo Rptr. 325 (1978).
63. 2 Navajo Rptr. 1 (1979).
64. 1 Navajo Rptr. 189 (1978).
65. 1 Navajo Rptr. 213 (1978).
66. Powers of Indian Tribes, I Op. Sol. 445, 455 (1934), cited in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 201 (1955), and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,
139 (1982).
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to parliamentary forms of government to find other examples of the
organizational or formal subordination of the judiciary to the legislature.
The prior Zah administration was elected in 1982 on a platform of
fostering greater formal separation of powers. As noted above, the "Su-
preme Judicial Council" was abolished by the Council in December of
1985. No longer is there a body of Council delegates able to review
decisions of the Tribal Courts. The Tribe in the prior Zah administration
received a grant from the Administration for Native Americans to ac-
complish a greater separation of powers.
67
Formal separation of powers has now been accomplished by resolution
of the Navajo Tribal Council passed on December 15, 1989. This resolution
reorganized completely the legislative and executive branches, provided
for a separation of powers between these two branches, and characterized
the Judicial Reform Act of 1985 as "treating the Judicial Branch as a
separate branch of government .... "168 The resolution is predicated on
the view of the Council that:
[I]t is in the best interest of the Navajo Nation that the Navajo
Nation Government be reorganized to provide the separation of func-
tions into three branches, and provide for checks and balances between
the three branches until the Navajo People decide through the Gov-
ernment Reform Project the form of government they want to be
governed by .... 69
As this language suggests, various proposed constitutions are being cir-
culated and discussed among the Navajo people, and further reorgani-
zation is a possibility. However, history strongly suggests that action to
adopt a constitution will take a long period of time, if, indeed, one is
ever adopted. Thus, persons contemplating doing business within the
Navajo Nation should not necessarily treat the 1989 reorganization as a
mere temporary measure, as the above language might suggest.
E. Ability of Non-Indians to Influence Decisionmaking
Attorneys for corporations seeking to invalidate tribal taxes argue that
such taxes impose "taxation without representation." Again, the Solicitor
General provided guidance:
That is not the unique situation of non-members of an Indian Res-
ervation, as is plain enough to residents of the District of Columbia,
taxed and ultimately ruled by a Congress in which they have no
voting representative. Certainly, petitioner has no standing to com-
plain, being a foreign corporation ... with no greater vote in the
Legislatures of New Mexico and Arizona than in the Navajo Tribal
Council. 70
67. Navajos to Use Grant Money to Revamp Tribal Operations, Albuquerque J., Feb. 2, 1986,
at C6.
68. Resolution No. CD-68-89, p. 1, 1 3.
69. Id. at 2, 1 8.
70. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 28; Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (citations omitted).
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Corporations may not vote in tribal elections, as is the case in all
states of the Union. Corporate interests, however, are represented in the
Tribal Council through the views of the Navajo employees of the cor-
poration. Corporate lobbying is a well-accepted phenomenon, although
corporate and non-member contributions to the Navajo political candidates
are prohibited. 7'
One must be a member of the Navajo Tribe to vote in tribal elections. 72
This, in the Supreme Court's view, does not limit the sovereign authority
of Indian nations over non-members doing business within Indian Country.73
United States corporations doing business in the Navajo Nation (a "do-
mestic, dependent nation' ")74 are plainly much better protected than those
doing business in foreign countries, given the pervasive authority of
Congress rooted in article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution.71
Other avenues for input into and influence upon tribal decisionmaking
exist. The executive agencies of the Navajo Nation are remarkably re-
ceptive and accessible. For purposes of this article, the agencies of most
impact are the Division of Economic Development, the Minerals De-
partment, and the Office of the President and Vice-President. In some
instances, the BIA and individual members of Congress have succeeded
in affecting tribal decisions regarding non-Indian proposals.
For a proposal with primarily local impacts, 76 though, the proponent
would be wise to contact local Chapter officials in order to present the
proposal to the Chapters. The proponent should be prepared to do this
several times (with an interpreter) and to wait-consensus politics in the
Navajo tradition often requires much explanation, reflection, deliberation,
and the building of personal trust and rapport. Projects determined to
be of benefit will ultimately be approved; those found detrimental to the
community will either be rejected or, more likely, not acted upon at all
in any final way.
Once Chapter approval is obtained, the Council Delegate is often
directed to facilitate compliance with tribal procedures in Window Rock.
Capable attorneys77 in Window Rock, Fort Defiance, and Gallup can
provide services of inestimable value in this regard.
71. NAVAJO TRm. CODE tit. 11, § 247 (Supp. 1985).
72. Id. § 6.
73. Compare Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982) with dissenting opinion
at 172-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Court
rejected the claim of an Indian tribe that it possessed the authority to try and punish a non-member
Indian of a criminal offense under its tribal laws. The Duro Court relied in great measure on the
principle of the consent of the governed, citing to the dissent in Merrion.
74. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
75. See Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 365, 386 (1989).
76. For economic development proposals with national impacts, the proponent of the project
should coordinate closely with the Navajo executive agency (such as the Division of Economic
Development) from the outset, as well as going to the Chapters.
77. These include former legal services attorneys, former tribal attorneys, and others with
significant experience with tribal institutions.
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F. Conclusion
This "Overview" is perhaps lengthier than might be considered war-
ranted by the primary purpose of this article, which is to discuss lender
recourse within the Navajo Nation. Those contemplating entering into
commercial transactions in Navajo Indian Country, however, must be
aware of the historical setting and the origins and peculiarities of the
Navajo government in order to make informed judgments about whether
or how to do business in Navajo Country.
It is this tradition which suggests several general approaches for creditors
in Navajo Country. First, it is far more effective and accepted in the
long run to establish personal relationships and to attempt to employ
non-coercive 8 types of enforcement means than to use initially the coercive
mechanisms made available by the Navajo Nation Council and the ju-
diciary. Second, initial lending decisions must be carefully evaluated, and
in many instances, a creditor who lends to Navajo small businesses must
be prepared and willing to assist actively the business owner in his own
operations and decisionmaking. Finally, Navajo tradition and values are
resilient and fundamental. Despite the adoption of commercial codes,
corporation codes, and Anglo-style dispute resolution mechanisms, the
creditor must be prepared to adapt to Navajo traditional ways. Navajo
institutions are unlikely to incorporate totally the adversarial and coercive
precepts of the non-Indian legal system.
III. TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES REGARDING PERSONAL
INDEBTEDNESS
Because there has been, at least prior to 1923, no historic conception
of economic activity undertaken by the Navajo Nation as a whole,7 9 no
substantive Navajo common law with respect to tribal debts or obligations
exists. Anthropological sources suggest that traditions and customs re-
garding debts of tribal members did, and perhaps still do, exist.80 Conn
notes that
[dlebt relationships were secured traditionally by families as well as
by individuals. They generally arose out of ongoing relationships
between creditor and debtor, be they Navajo and white trader or
Navajo and Navajo....
78. In R. YouNo, supra note 8, at 91, Young states that until 1936
[n]o traditional native institution in the history of the Tribe ever had possessed or
used coercion as an instrument for internal control-including the institution of
the Headmen. In fact, coercion was repugnant to the principles of democratic
government in Navajo society-and, even today, the Council is reluctant to enact
obligatory legislation affecting the tribal membership, preferring to rely instead on
persuasion.
To the same effect, see id. at 25, 48-49; A. Wn.i.ims, supra note 32, at 6-7, 12, 61.
79. See Haile, Property Concepts of the Navaho Indians, CATHOUC UNlvERSITY ANTHROPOLOGICAL
SEtups No. 17, 54 (1954).
80. Such customs and usages apply in civil actions. See NAvo TaRn. CODE tit. 7, § 204 (Supp.
1985).
Spring 1991]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
Where tied to the community or local economic cycles, debts were
repaid. In this realm, social control by the family or by Chapter
officials was strong enough without law. The tribe's loan program
was built upon this local base. Loans were screened by individuals
in local communities. The tribe lost only seven-tenths of 1 per cent
of nearly $700,000 disbursed.8
Few Navajos, until the 1960's, used the Navajo courts to collect debts
owed by others. 82
Fr. Berard Haile reported that, in the 1930's, gambling debts were
secured by "arm security," as well as by tangible property.
After a gambler had lost "his bundle" meaning, whatever loose
property he carried with him, he might stake "other" properties left
at home. He would ask saxado'cih that he be "credited" on these.
If the winner expressed doubt about the existence of such properties
the loser would raise his arm, left or right, as security. This implied
that he pledged himself to 'aganbe'na'nis "labor by arm" to work
out the value of his wager. This was considered the highest security.
On the strength of that security he could continue in the sport. 3
Haile describes the Navajo lender as "inexorable," asserting that a
Navajo lender "demands more interest and security than whites are in
the habit of asking."8' "As a rule the Navaho strive to pay debts
incurred.' '85
Hill's field notes86 report the information supplied by Late Little Smith's
Son of Crownpoint:
Lending. In the old days if a man was hard up he would come
to some one and beg for something and get it free. Later on borrowing
came in. Even in the old days, though, a man would replace what
he had borrowed or even give back a little more because he would
say it has been a great help. In a debt like that if both parties died
the debt was cancelled. 87
Van Valkenburgh traced the development of Navajo contract law some-
what sketchily. 88 If Van Valkenburgh is correct, traditional social controls
81. Conn, supra note 43, at 356-57 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). By contrast, the current
default rate in the centralized BIA and tribal loan programs is reported to be 60%. Gallup Independent,
Feb. 1, 1991, at 1.
82. Conn, supra note 43, at 358.
83. Haile, supra note 79, at 44.
84. Id. at 46.
85. Id.
86. W. Hill, Concerning Law Among the Navajo Indians (unpublished field notes) (available at
University of New Mexico Law Library, call no. IND-KF-8228-N3H55). These field notes are undated,
but probably date from 1933-1934. See C. KiucKHom, NAvAo MATERIAL CULTURE vii (1971).
87. Hill, supra note 86, at 6.
88. MUSEUM OF NoRTHRN ARIZONA, NAvAo CoMMoN. LAW vol. 9, no. 4 (1936) [hereinafter
NAvAJo COMMOIN LAW]; id. vol. 9, no. 10 (1937); id. vol. 10, no. 12 (1938).
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sufficed to secure debts through at least 1938, with the "Indian courts"
showing "general indifference" to such matters.
8 9
IV. NAVAJO SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Overview and Trends
This section discusses the substantive law which applies in the Navajo
courts in actions brought by creditors. While this article focuses on
consumer and business lending to non-governmental persons and entities,
the issues of sovereign immunity and the trust status of tribal lands,
issues raised almost always in conjunction with transactions involving the
Tribe or tribal enterprises, are also treated briefly in the following section.
The substantive law, as enacted by the Navajo Tribal Council, has
seen major changes during the past thirty years. The mistrust of secured
creditors in the 1950's9O has given way to deferential protection of their
interests in recent years. The Council, in 1968, enacted a resolution 9'
which prohibits unconsented-to self-help repossessions, as is the law in
Wisconsin 92 and Louisiana. The legislative history of this resolution shows
an increased sensitivity to creditor interests; indeed, one of the Council
delegates who participated most significantly in the Council debates related
his experiences as a repossessor for motor vehicle dealerships.
While creditors are not particularly happy with the procedural require-
ments imposed by this resolution, practitioners in the Navajo courts
generally agree that these courts provide prompt and adequate relief for
secured creditors. In addition, both the Council and the courts have
attempted to ease the burden on creditors imposed by this resolution.
First, Tribal Council Resolution No. CJA-8-78 (January 24, 1978), while
affirming the protections for individual Navajo debtors, declared that
sections 607-609 were not intended to apply to the commercial relationships
entered into by enterprises of the Navajo Nation itself. Second, and even
more important to this discussion, the judges of the Navajo courts adopted
special court rules on January 29, 1982 "providing a rule of pleading,
practice, and procedure for the repossession of personal property by
creditors where such property is security for a loan or other extension
of credit." Whether or not this rulemaking is authorized by Navajo
Tribal Code title 7, section 601, it is remarkable evidence of the view
of the judiciary that the extension of credit to Navajos is beneficial to
the Nation and should not be discouraged by unnecessarily protracted
89. Id. vol. 10, no. 12, at 43. This is similar to the experience of other tribes, which settled
civil matters in traditional ways. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 615, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892).
90. See Conn, supra note 43, at 355-67.
91. NAVArJO Tsm. CODE tit. 7, §§ 607-609 (Supp. 1985).
92. See Whitford & Laufer, The Impact of Denying Self-Help Repossession of Automobiles: A
Case Study of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 607 (1975).
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proceedings to enforce security interests. Decisions of the tribal courts
construe creditor rights broadly. 93
Most recently, the Tribal Council has enacted a Navajo Uniform
Commercial Code ("NUCC") and a Navajo Nation Corporation Code("Corporation Code"). The NUCC and Corporation Code are both
designed to encourage business development in the Navajo Nation and
to reassure creditors that Navajo law offers protection comparable to
state law.Y
The substantive law of debtor-creditor relations in the Navajo Nation
is found generally in title 7 of the Navajo Tribal Code. Substantive rights
in the Navajo courts are governed by the choice of law provision.95
Section 204 of the law appears to establish a hierarchy of law to be
applied if the Council has not yet spoken: first, customs and usages of
the Tribe; second, federal laws and regulations; third, laws of the state
"in which the matter in dispute may lie."' 6
With respect to this hierarchy, there have been several proposals, the
most recent by the Navajo Nation Bar Association, to document Navajo
traditional customs and usages. This work has not been completed. In
addition, no reported decision of the Navajo courts has been found
applying traditional customs and usages to debtor-creditor disputes. In-
stead, the tribal courts have looked to state and federal law.9 Nonetheless,
creditors should be aware that Navajo custom and tradition, if proved
at trial, could preempt the commercial law developed by the states.9 8
In sum, practitioners in tribal courts generally feel that secured creditors
are adequately protected by Navajo law in Navajo courts. Unsecured
creditors face serious difficulties, on the other hand, and practitioners
assert a need for mechanisms for examination of debtors and for gar-
93. See, e.g., Becenti v. Laughlin, 4 Navajo Rptr. 147 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1983) (per Tso);
A-I Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Becenti, 2 Navajo Rptr. 21 (Crownpoint D. Ct. 1979); see also General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bitah, 6 Navajo Rptr. 104 (1988) (reversing judgment awarding $85,000
damages against GMAC).
94. In a very general sense, the NUCC simply restated the law that had been applied prior to
the enactment of the Navajo U.C.C. because the Navajo choice of law provision, NAVAJO TRIa.
CODE tit. 7, § 204, borrowed state commercial law in cases before the tribal courts. However, the
Navajo Nation extends over three states, and the state statutes and the interpretations of the U.C.C.
by state courts have not been uniform. New Mexico, for example, did not adopt the 1972 amendments
to the UCC until 1985, effective January 1, 1986. 1985 N.M. Laws ch. 193.
95. NAvAJo TRm. CODE tit. 7, § 204 (Supp. 1985).
96. Id. § 204(c); see JuDiciAL BRANcH OF THE NAvAJO NATION, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1988).
97. See, e.g., Manygoats v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 4 Navajo Rptr. 94, 96 (1983);
Johnson v. Dixon, 4 Navajo Rptr. 108 (1983); General Electric Credit Corp. v. Vandever, 1 Navajo
Rptr. 352 (Crownpoint D. Ct. 1978).
98. See Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Navajo Rptr. 209, 210 (1986) (finding that Navajo customary
law allowed for damages for wrongful death, and refusing to adopt the common law of the states
which requires legislative authorization for wrongful death actions); Estate of Belone, 5 Navajo
Rptr. 161, 164-65 (1987) (traditional adoption); Estate of Apache, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178, 182-83 (1978)(custom of intestate distribution discussed under N"AVJO Tam. CODE tit. 8, § 2(b)); Estate of Thomas,
6 Navajo Rptr. 129 (1988); cf. Estate of Benally, 5 Navajo Rptr. 174, 176-77 (1987) (discussing
failure of proof to support position that Navajo custom favors oldest child in division of estate
property). See generally, Tso, supra note 2, at 233-34.
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nishment of wages. 99 Most important, however, is the fact that both the
Council and the judiciary are cognizant of, and have acted to accom-
modate, needs of secured creditors.
B. Indian Law Issues
Two related matters, tribal sovereign immunity and the trust status of
Indian lands, concern lenders doing business in Indian Country. The
existing literature generally supports the view that "the complexity of
Indian land ownership and control always creates uncertainty and sub-
stantial delay, and adds to the cost of doing business in Indian country."1°°
Tribal trust land is not mortgageable.' 0'
On the other hand, a lessee of tribal trust lands may encumber its
leasehold interest to obtain funds to improve the leased premises. 102 The
Window Rock Field Solicitor, in an interview conducted in January of
1986, opined that such arrangements are of limited utility, at best. The
Field Solicitor noted that, although at least one substantial investment
had been secured in this manner for a Navajo tribal administration
building, investors will generally not be very interested in a leasehold in
a remote area to begin with and that, therefore, the presence of a leasehold
mortgage alternative is not likely to make most investments significantly
more attractive to an investor. Moreover, in an opinion by a lender's
attorney, 10 3 the leasehold mortgage capability is only as viable as fore-
closure proceedings are able to assure satisfaction of the obligation.
°4
99. To the extent that security for a debt is insufficient to cover the obligation, these comments
are applicable to secured creditors as well. Part VI of this article discusses remedies under Navajo
law.
100. E. Natwig, Initiatives In Development Finance: Institutional Barriers to Financing Development
Projects in Indian Country 7 (July 1981) (unpublished manuscript); accord, e.g., Office of Arid
Land Studies, University of Arizona, Development Financing Alternatives on Tribal Lands: The
Lender's Perspective 5 (Nov. 1981) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Development Financing
Alternatives].
101. See E. Natwig, supra note 100, at 5. Individual Indian allotments may be mortgaged,
however, with the approval of the Department of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1983); 25 C.F.R.
§ 152.34 (1989). Interior officials do not encourage such mortgages. State courts have no subject
matter jurisdiction over foreclosures of these mortgages. Northwest S.D. Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Smith, 784 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986); Crow Tribe v. Deernose, 158 Mont. 25, 487 P.2d 1133 (1971);
Southwest Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Martinez, No. 85-113 (McKinley County, N.M.D. Ct. 1986); F.
COHEN, HANDBOOK Op FEDERAL INVAN LAW 621-22 (1982). Contra Federal Land Bank of Wichita
v. Burris, 790 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1990).
102. 25 C.F.R. § 162.12 (1985).
103. The opinion is reproduced as Appendix A to Development Financing Alternatives, supra
note 100.
104. Development Financing Alternatives, supra note 100, at 23. There have been at least three
foreclosures of leasehold interests on tribal trust lands by the Farmers Home Administration ("FHA"),
according to tribal attorneys. The federal Justice Department attorney who handles such foreclosures
noted that the cases in Navajo Country have been settled, or the Tribe (in the case of an allotment
foreclosure action) has purchased the land at its appraised value. The attorney in the Office of the
General Counsel for FHA in Albuquerque who works most directly with Navajo foreclosures states
that any foreclosures have been accomplished judicially. FHA is able to go to federal court in these
actions because the United States is the plaintiff. The actions in federal court for Navajo foreclosures
are pursued in the same manner as non-Indian foreclosures. FHA has not asked for deficiencies,
for two reasons: first and most important, FHA recognizes Arizona law, which does not allow
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Thus, the Tribe's sovereign immunity is implicated in lender decision-
making, where a tribe (or tribal authority imbued with tribal sovereign
immunity) is the lessor. The lender's counsel concludes that only an act
of Congress abrogating a tribe's sovereign immunity would assure that
a tribe's sovereign immunity would not bar recourse.' 5 This conclusion
has been proved erroneous, given recent developments in caselaw.
While earlier cases stated that tribal sovereign immunity from suit
would bar suits against tribes "either in the federal or state courts,
without Congressional authorization,"' 10 6 the sounder view is that Indian
tribes may waive such immunity if such waiver is unequivocally ex-
pressed.'07 Having examined the law of Indian sovereign immunity, a
report concludes: "The tribe as a business corporation, or certain tribally
chartered subsidiary corporations, have been successful in creating a
limited waiver of tribal sovereign immunity under conditions that dem-
onstrate such immunity has been knowingly and validly waived."' 0 The
Navajo Tribal Council did precisely that in resolutions CO-62-80 and
CN-71-80, relating to the Navajo Agricultural Products Industries("NAPI"), providing a limited waiver of Navajo sovereign immunity in
order to secure financing with a major institutional lender.' °9
The NAPI resolutions were enacted to modify to this limited extent
the 1980 Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act.110 The Act provides procedures
for asserting claims against the Navajo Nation where such claims are
authorized."' In general, however, enterprises of the Navajo Nation are
deficiency judgments on residential property; second, the debtor would likely be judgment-proof,
in the experience of the attorney for FHA.
A potential area of concern was raised by one tribal attorney that the current homesite lease
form being used differs somewhat from the form approved many years ago by the Advisory
Committee. In light of the extensive delegated authority in NAVAjO TRB. CODE tit. 2, §§ 341(b)(4),343(b)(8), 344(c)(4)(D) (Supp. 1985) and longstanding practice, this concern is no longer valid.
105. Development Financing Alternatives, supra note 100, at 20-21. Appendix B to the study
consists of an article entitled A Lender's View of Unsubordinated Ground Leases. In addition to
the option of unsubordinated ground leases, arrangements where movable (and removable) assets
are encumbered have proved useful, as in the financing of Navajo Agricultural Products Industries,
according to the Window Rock Field Solicitor.
106. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Hollywood, 361 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir.
1966); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).
107. Enterprise Management Consultants v. United States ex rel. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 894, 895
n.5 (10th Cir. 1989); Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315,
318 (10th Cir. 1982); Wichita and Affiliated Tribes of Okla. v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 773' (D.C.
Cir. 1986); American Indian Agric. Credit Corp. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374,
1377-79 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. State of Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981);
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982);
see also Rehner v. Rice, 678 F.2d 1340, 1351 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S.
713 (1983); cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982).
108. KARL A. Futmx & AssocIATEs, TunJu BuswNEss LAW DE ELOPMENT PROJECT 91 (1983).
109. If relying on a waiver of sovereign immunity, a lender should observe limitations on a tribal
official's ability to waive immunity. See, e.g., Hydrothermal Energy Corp. v. Fort Bidwell Indian
Community, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 5103 (Cal. Ct. App. July
23, 1985) (without delegation of authority to waive Community's immunity from suit, tribal chairman's
attempt to do so was invalid).
110. NAvAJo TRn. CODE tit. 1, §§ 351-355 (Supp. 1985).
111. Id. § 354.
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immune from suit." 2 Officials of the Navajo Nation, not including the
members of the Tribal Council, may be sued to compel performance of
duties under Navajo or federal law." 3
The Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act followed several cases decided by
the Navajo Court of Appeals. In Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Electric
Co.," 4 the court stated that it "has always upheld and presently does
uphold the sovereign immunity doctrine of the Navajo Nation .. .
Nonetheless, finding that executive officers had acted outside the scope
of their authority in Dennison, suit was permitted. Dennison was followed
by Keeswood v. Navajo Tribe,"6 where the court "strongly urge[d] the
Navajo Tribal Council to examine the trend in American law and take
some kind of affirmative action on the issue of sovereign immunity.""PI
7
Again, while holding that the Tribe could not be sued without its consent,
the court affirmed the district court's holding that individuals employed
by the Tribe could be sued if they "exceeded their lawful authority.""' 8
The Land v. Dollar' 9 exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine was
also noted in Davis v. Navajo Tribe'2 and discussed in Johnson v. Navajo
Nation.12' The Navajo Tribal Council addressed the issue comprehensively
in 1980 in the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act.'2 The 1980 Sovereign
Immunity Act was amended in 1986.'2
The above discussion suggests strongly that each transaction with the
Navajo Nation or its enterprises must be considered sui generis. Further,
secure financing of leasehold improvements on tribal trust land will depend
on the terms of the tribal lease, and a prudent lender should, if necessary,
seek lease modifications to assure that a foreclosure action would ulti-
mately protect its interests in the debtor's assets.
C. Repossessions
Repossession of personal property in Navajo Indian Country is governed
by Navajo Tribal Code title 7, sections 607-610, reproduced below:
112. Id. §§ 352(13), 353(a). The court of appeals has held, however, that such immunity does
not extend to enterprises in garnishment actions authorized by the Navajo Tribal Code. Foster v.
Lee, 3 Navajo Rptr. 203 (1982).
113. NAvjo TaRE. CODE tit. 7, § 854(d) (Supp. 1985).
114. 1 Navajo Rptr. 95 (1974).
115. Id. at 105.
116. 2 Navajo Rptr. 46 (1979).
117. Id. at 55.
118. Id. at 56.
119. 330 U.S. 731 (1947), limited, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682 (1949).
120. 1 Navajo Rptr. 379, 381 (Crownpoint D. Ct. 1978).
121. 5 Navajo Rptr. 192, 195-96 (1987). "Indeed, Section 253 [NAvMo Tam. CODE tit. 7, § 253]
would give the district courts jurisdiction over ultra vires actions of tribal officials without running
afoul of the sovereign immunity doctrine." Id. at 196; accord TBI Contractors, Inc. v. Navajo
Tribe, 6 Navajo Rptr. 116 (1988) ("Sovereign immunity does not extend to protect tribal officials
who act outside the law."). TBI Contractors, Inc. is most significant in its discussion of the
relationship of tribal sovereign immunity with economic development. See 6 Navajo Rptr. at 126-
27.
122. NAvAio Tam. CODE tit. 1, §§ 351-55 (1985).
123. See Johnson v. Navajo Nation, 5 Navajo Rptr. 192, 200 n.4 (1987).
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§ 607. Repossession of personal property
The personal property of Navajo Indians shall not be taken from
land subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe under the pro-
cedures of repossession except in strict compliance with the following:
(1) Written consent to remove the property from land subject. to
the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe shall be secured from the purchaser
at the time repossession is sought. The written consent shall be retained
by the creditor and exhibited to the Navajo Tribe upon proper demand.
(2) Where the Navajo refuses to sign said written consent to permit
removal of the property from land subject to the jurisdiction of the
Navajo Tribe, the property shall be removed only by order of a
Tribal Court of the Navajo Tribe in an appropriate legal proceeding.
§ 608. Violations-Penalty
(a) Any nonmember of the Navajo Tribe, except persons authorized
by Federal law to be present on Tribal land, found to be in wilful
violation of 7 N.T.C. § 607 may be excluded from land subject to
the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe in accordance with procedure set
forth in 17 N.T.C. §§ 1903-1906.
(b) Any business whose employees are found to be in wilful, violation
of 7 N.T.C. § 607 may be denied the privilege of doing business on
land subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe.
(c) Any Indian who violates any provision of 7 N.T.C. § 607 shall
be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished by a
fine of not more than $100.
§ 609. Civil Liability
Any person who violates 7 N.T.C. § 607 and any business whose
employee violates such section is deemed to have breached the peace
of the lands under the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe, and shall
be civilly liable to the purchaser for any loss caused by the failure
to comply with 7 N.T.C. §§ 607-609.
If the personal property repossessed is consumer goods (to wit:
goods used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or
household purposes), the purchaser has the right to recover in any
event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus 10% of
the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus
10% of the cash price.
Purchaser means the person who owes payment or other performance
of an obligation secured by personal property, whether or not the
purchaser owns or has rights in the personal property.
§ 610. Agencies of United States
The provisions of 7 N.T.C. §§ 607-609 shall not apply to legally
recognized agencies of the United States Government.
As the statute indicates, unconsented-to self-help is prohibited. 24 Viol-
ations of these provisions subject the creditor to civil liability, as set out
in section 609, and may subject the creditor to exclusion from the Navajo
Nation under section 608.125
124. See Russell v. Donaldson, 3 Navajo Rptr. 209, 213 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1982).
125. See Naswood v. Foremost Fin. Servs., 3 Navajo Rptr. 138, 140 (1982).
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The Navajo statute is similar to one enacted by the Wisconsin legislature.
It appears that the prohibition of unconsented-to self-help repossessions
under the Wisconsin law has not had any significant effect on credit
practices in that state. 26
The authority of Navajo law on repossessions within the Navajo Nation
is clear, 27 and the repossession laws are accorded full faith and credit
by the New Mexico courts'2 and comity by the Arizona courts.
29 Of
interest to creditors doing business with the Tribe itself is Tribal Council
Resolution CJA-8-78 (Jan. 24, 1978), which affirms that the protections
afforded by Navajo Tribal Code title 7, sections 607-609 were intended
to benefit individual Navajo debtors, and not to apply to the commercial
relationships entered into by enterprises of the Navajo Nation.
Creditors have attempted to circumvent the requirement of written
consent to repossession by various means. Often, creditors are able to
obtain signatures on consent forms from Navajo buyers at the time of
purchase. The Navajo courts have rejected this strategy, requiring in all
cases that the written consent be obtained at the time that repossession
is effected.
D. The Navajo Uniform Commercial Code30
1. Background and Policy
The Executive Summary of the then-proposed NUCC gives the back-
ground of the Navajo Nation's efforts to enact a commercial code. The
initial thrust was the formation of a task force in May of 1978. The
task force "found that adoption of the NUCC would stimulate economic
and business development by encouraging more bank financing of bus-
inesses on the Navajo Reservation."
The University of Arizona's Office of Arid Land Studies studied the
general question of Indian commercial codes from 1978 to 1980. A draft
UCC was produced and examined by the Navajo task force in 1982.
The task force ultimately decided to hire a law firm to refine earlier
drafts and propose a Navajo UCC. The Center for Indian Economic
Development did so, and its draft was reviewed and, in some instances,
126. See Whitford & Laufer, supra note 92, at 656. The special rules adopted by the Navajo
judiciary to simplify and expedite replevin actions further reduce any impacts on credit practices
within the Navajo Nation, assuming the validity of such rules. See infra notes 214-37 and accom-
panying text.
127. See Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 593-94 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
128. Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).
129. Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1977). See generally
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
130. Resolution No. CJA-1-86 (Jan. 29, 1986) [hereinafter NUCC]. The NUCC was amended by
Resolution No. CD-61-86 (Dec. 11, 1986), clarifying the authority of the Commerce Department
of the Division of Economic Development to promulgate regulations. The most recent supplement
to the Navajo Tribal Code was published in 1987 and includes only the resolutions passed through
the end of 1985. Therefore, this article cites to the sections of the NUCC as adopted by the Navajo
Nation Council, rather than to a codified version.
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criticized by the Navajo Nation's Department of Justice in early 1984.'1'
After orientation meetings in May of 1985, a final draft was prepared
and draft resolutions were submitted to and circulated between the Ec-
onomic and Community Development Committee and the Advisory Com-
mittee of the Navajo Tribal Council. The Council, after reviewing several
drafts by these committees, adopted the Navajo Uniform Commercial
Code.
13 2
The Executive Summary gives the following purpose of the NUCC:
"The encouragement of business activities on the Navajo Nation is the
primary benefit of adopting a Navajo Uniform Commercial Code (NUCC).
A secondary benefit of its adoption is the enforcement of Navajo sov-
ereignty." Later, the Executive Summary states that
[t]he creation of a conducive climate for business and economic
development on the Navajo Reservation is the basic purpose of the
creation of a Navajo Uniform Commercial Code. The realization of
this basic goal will lead to increasing the level of commercial banking
activity and thus the development of more Navajo-owned and operated
small businesses on the Reservation.
Official comments which address policy matters are in accord. The
Official Comment to section 9-313 of the NUCC states that "the general
policy of the Navajo Nation is to encourage commercial transactions and
to enable Navajo debtors to maximize their credit worthiness by maxi-
mizing the business property which they can use as collateral."
The second policy identified in the Executive Summary-advancement
of Navajo sovereignty-is also reflected in such a way as to promote
commercial activities in Navajo Indian Country. In discussing changes
in section 9-401 of the NUCC, the Official Comment notes that "[t]he
changes reflect the fact that the Navajo Nation wishes to exercise its
civil jurisdictiont over Navajo Indian Country to avoid the confusion
caused by the otherwise conflicting jurisdictions." Changes to section 9-
504 of the NUCC also show a desire to facilitate lending by providing
a presumptively satisfactory means of notice of sale of repossessed goods.
2. Differences Between the NUCC and the UCC Adopted by the
States
The NUCC includes what are termed "Special Plain Language Com-
ments" in addition to the Official Comments accompanying the UCC.
131. These comments, if the Navajo Nation chooses to release them, would be useful legislative
history of the NUCC. Early drafts of the NUCC would have, for example, distinguished contracts
between Navajos from contracts between Navajos and non-Navajos, would have made the Navajo
Nation a testing ground for substantive provisions believed by the drafters to be superior to those
adopted by the fifty states, and would have created a mechanism for Tribal Council approval of
forms of contracts. The Department of Justice, among others, urged a Navajo UCC more closely
modeled on the UCC, and such was passed in January of 1986 by the Council. A vestige of the
earlier draft inadvertently remains in the Commentary to § 9-317 of the NUCC, referring to "Approved
Contracts."
132. Resolution No. CJA-1-86 (Jan. 29, 1986).
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These special comments are intended to "facilitate use of the Code,"' 33
but they, like the other comments, "are not the law.'
34
While the NUCC is designed to conform to the general UCC in order
to provide a stable and predictable environment for commercial lending,
some modifications to the general UCC have been made. These modi-
fications are grouped into six categories.
The first group recognizes that the NUCC cannot affect restrictions
on alienation of trust property. This includes, primarily, Navajo Tribal
trust land and individual Indian trust allotments. The NUCC does not
attempt to decide questions of trust law, 3' but notes that the trust
responsibility of the federal government may affect transactions involving
real property of the Navajo Nation and that "Navajo statutes dealing
with realty are not to be lightly disregarded or altered" by article 2 of
the NUCC. 36
The NUCC contains only articles I, II, III, and IX of the UCC. This
is termed "phase I of the NUCC" in the Executive Summary. This
phased approach is justified in the Executive Summary by "human and
financial constraints, and the need to educate the Navajo people" before
adoption of the remaining articles. The partial adoption of the UCC,
however, requires that some technical changes be made to those portions
of the UCC which refer to the remaining articles. The NUCC usually
remedies this situation by referring to the tribal choice of law provision,
37
which, in most commercial transactions, incorporates applicable state
law. 38 Occasionally, portions of the omitted articles are incorporated into
the body of the NUCC, such as the definitions in sections 9-105 and 9-
302 and with respect to rights of subrogation in section 3-801.39
A third area of divergence from the UCC seeks to protect the "tra-
ditional" Navajo economy, including barter transactions under $10,000' 40
and Indian artists.' 4' Other provisions attempt to recognize peculiarities
of the Navajo economy. For example, buyers of farm products are given
greater protection under section 9-307; goods regularly used for personal
133. NUCC, supra note 130, at Official Comments following § 1-102(6).
134. Id.
135. For example, the drafters noted that 'things attached to realty' may be considered, in some
instances, trust property." Id. at Commentary No. I following § 2-105; id. at Commentary No. 2
following § 2-107; see id. at Commentary No. 2 following §§ 2-304, 2-102. In addition, property
purchased with trust funds may continue to be impressed with the trust; see also Superintendent
of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); F. COHEN, supra note 101, at 628-
32.
136. NUCC, supra note 130, at Commentary No. 2 following § 2-304.
137. NAVAJo TIa. CODE tit. 7, § 204 (Supp. 1985).
138. See, e.g., NUCC, supra note 130, at Commentary following §§ 2-308, 2-310, 2-323, 2-503,
2-505, 2-506, 2-507, 2-512, 2-514, 2-603, 2-614, 3-103, 3-418, 9-203, 9-309, and 9-312.
139. See also id. §§ 9-304, 9-305 (incorporating certain provisions of article 8 regarding certificated
securities); §§ 9-403 to -406 (making adjustments needed because of the establishment of a filing
system).
140. See id. § 1-110.
141. See id. § 2-104 (excluding individual artists from the definition of merchants); id. § 9-114
(giving artists who consign goods priority over the creditors of consignors).
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and family use are defined in section 9-109 as consumer goods even
though they may more often be used for business; and oral creations
or negations of express warranties must be "comprehensible to the pur-
chaser" according to the Comment to section 2-316.142 Finally, section
9-503 makes clear that self-help repossessions prohibited by Navajo Tribal
Code title 7, section 607 are not allowed by the NUCC.143
The NUCC differs from the UCC in a fourth way, which reflects the
position of the Navajo Tribal Council with respect to the sovereign
immunity of the Tribe and some of its enterprises. 144 This article neither
examines in depth the law of tribal sovereign immunity nor determines
which of the Navajo enterprises are protected under the sovereign im-
munity doctrine. 4s Transactions with the Navajo Nation or its enterprises
must be evaluated by a lender on a case-by-case basis. This article, again,
focuses on lending to small businesses and individuals within Navajo
Indian Country. 14
Fifth, the NUCC adopts at times the provisions of California's UCC.
These provisions include sections 9-104(g) and 9-104(g)(1), 9-105(c), 9-
106, and 9-302 concerning the use of deposit accounts and insurance
policies as security; section 9-208 regarding multiple branches or offices
of the secured party; section 9-307 regarding the protections accorded
buyers of farm products and consumer goods without notice of security
interests therein; and section 9-311, clarifying that transfers of a debtor's
rights in collateral may constitute defaults under the security agreements.
. A sixth category of divergence from the UCC adopted by most of the
states is, of necessity, termed "miscellaneous." Two of the sections of
the NUCC grant greater protections to the creditor. 47 Section 9-502 is
a mixed blessing for creditors, requiring on the one hand a "conspicuous
written agreement to predefault collection of assigned rights to pay-
ment,'" 148 while including remedies for the security interest in a deposit
account. Finally, alternative C of the general UCC (regarding warranties)
was adopted in section 2-318; additional protections to buyers in the case
of sellers' insolvencies are granted in section 2-502 of the NUCC; and
portions of the 1962 version of section 9-505 were adopted in the NUCC,
requiring a written 30-day notice from the secured party to the debtor.
142. Section 2-316 of the NUCC also adds a subsection to delete the implied warranty relating
to health of animals in a sale unless the seller knowingly sells diseased animals. Greater clarity in
notices to debtors is required in § 9-318, consistent with the general need for comprehensibility
recognized in § 2-316.
143. See supra text part IV.C; see also NUCC, supra note 130, at Commentary following § 9-
307.
144. See id. §§ 1-201(30), 9-104(e).
145. For a more complete discussion of sovereign immunity issues, see Frye, Defining the General
Contours of the Sovereign Immunity of Indian Nations, I INDiAN L.J. 17 (1988).
146. "Navajo Indian Country" is defined in NAvAjo TRi. CODE tit. 7, § 254 (Supp. 1985) and
incorporated into § 1-201(26) of the NUCC.
147. One section establishes a presumptively adequate method of notice of sale or disposition of
repossessed goods. See NUCC, supra note 130, § 9-504. The other extends protections for persons
claiming security interests in chattel paper to proceeds from the sale of all goods, not merely
inventory. See id. § 9-502.
148. Id. at Official Comment to § 9-502.
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3. Summary
The Navajo UCC is intended to encourage commercial and consumer
lending within the Navajo Nation, while excepting traditional exchanges
from the NUCC and recognizing some special characteristics of the Navajo
economy and demography. Six areas of difference between the NUCC
and the UCC adopted by most of the states have been discussed. Because
the NUCC does not purport to (and cannot) affect the trust duty of the
United States, the NUCC's recognition of the federal trusteeship with
respect to certain property is of no significance to potential lenders.
Because the Navajo choice of law provision'49 will incorporate state law
where Navajo law is absent, the phased approach of the Tribal Council
is also of little significance to lenders, although some consideration must
be given to differences among the states of Utah, Arizona, and New
Mexico in their interpretations of articles 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the UCC,
if a transaction in Navajo Indian Country has a logical nexus to more
than one of these states.
The added protections for traditional Navajo barter transactions and
for Navajo artists should be noted, but will have little commercial impact.
Also, the NUCC does not affect the need to examine on a case-by-case
basis transactions involving the Navajo Nation or its enterprises.
The changes or differences which are most significant to creditors will
be those in the fifth and sixth categories above. Added protections for
creditors with regard to deposit accounts, chattel paper, and presumptively
adequate notice are accorded. Creditors will continue to be barred from
unconsented-to self-help repossessions, 50 and buyers of farm products
are treated somewhat differently in the NUCC. Finally, creditors must
take care to abide by the requirements of comprehensibility and notice,
which are stricter than some provisions of the UCC. 5' Moreover, filing
of security interests must now conform to Navajo law in section 9-401.152
E. The Navajo Corporation Code'53
By resolution No. CJA-2-86 on January 30, 1986, the Navajo Tribal
Council passed the Navajo Corporation Code, containing four Chapters:
(1) General Corporation Law; (2) Close Corporations; (3) Non-profit
Corporations; and (4) Agricultural Cooperatives. The Corporation Code's
impact on lending decisions will be slight, but some features should be
noted here.
The preamble to the Code states its purposes are "to permit the
formation of various corporate entities and require registration of foreign
corporations; and to regulate such entities so as to promote economic
149. NAvAJo Tam. CODE tit. 7, § 204 (Supp. 1985).
150. Id. § 607.
151. See NUCC, supra note 130, §§ 9-502, 9-505, 2-316.
152. Section 9-401 will require technical amendments when implementing steps for the filing system
are formulated and adopted.
153. See Resolution No. CJA-2-86 (Jan. 30, 1986) [hereinafter Corporation Code]. For the reasons
detailed supra note 130, citation is made to the resolution of the Navajo Nation Council.
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growth and further the exercise of tribal sovereignty in the governance
of its territory and citizens." Thus, any corporate entity seeking to do
business within Navajo Indian Country, as defined by Navajo Tribal
Code title 7, section 254, must comply with the Corporation Code.
154
The designation of a registered agent is required.
55
Corporations formed under the Corporation Code are required to state
in their articles of incorporation that they will "abide by all criminal,
civil and regulatory jurisdiction [sic] of the Navajo Nation."'15 6 Names
of corporations formed under the Corporation Code may not include
the words "bank," "trust," "Navajo Nation," "Navajo Tribe," or
"deposit."' ' 57 Navajo corporations will be dissolved involuntarily by a
judgment of a tribal court in an action filed by the Attorney General
when any one of six conditions is established.158 These include violations
of the laws of the Navajo Nation and conduct of business "in a fraudulent
or otherwise illegal manner" over a period of time. 159
Piercing of the corporate veil of Navajo corporations will be determined
in accordance with other decisional law (generally state law) under the
Navajo choice of law provisions. 60 The Corporation Code lists seven
circumstances which may be considered by a tribal court in reaching its
determination. These include fraud, misrepresentation, thin capitalization,
ultra-hazardous activities, violation of applicable consumer protection
laws, criminal wrongdoing, and failure to maintain adequate insurance.' 6'
Stockholder meetings need not be held within the Navajo Nation. 62 Navajo
corporations may not sue in tribal courts unless all fees and charges
have been paid. 63 Inherent in this requirement is that articles, certificates,
and other papers must be filed with the Department of Commerce in
order for such corporations to utilize the tribal courts.'6
Foreign corporations may not transact business within the Navajo
Nation absent conformity with the Corporation Code. 65 However, the
maintenance of actions in tribal courts is not necessarily considered the
transaction of business. 66 Nothing in the Code authorizes the Navajo
government to regulate the organization or internal affairs of foreign
corporations. 67 A foreign corporation must have a registered agent. 16
154. Corporation Code § 168.
155. Id. § 173.
156. Id. § 109(a)(10).
157. The same is true for foreign corporations. Id. §§ 170(d), 107.
158. Id. § 143.
159. Id. § 143(b).
160. See NAvAjo TriB. CODE tit. 7, § 204 (Supp. 1985).
161. Corporation Code, supra note 153, § 119(c).
162. Id. § 122.
163. Id. § 167(b).
164. See id. § 167(a).
165. Id. § 168(a).
166. Id. § 168(b)(1).
167. Id. § 168(a).
168. Id. § 173.
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The Corporation Code requires a foreign corporation desiring to transact
business within the Navajo Nation to apply for such authority in ac-
cordance with rules to be promulgated by the Department of Commerce. 
69
Revocation of authority of foreign corporations to do business within
the Navajo Nation is provided for under section 175 of the Corporation
Code. Any corporation transacting business within the Navajo Nation
without compliance with the Corporation Code may be enjoined from
doing business by a tribal court upon an action brought by the Attorney
General or any other person.170 Whereas any corporation not transacting
business within the Navajo Nation may bring suit in tribal courts without
securing authority to transact business from the Department of Commerce,
foreign corporations doing business in Navajo Indian Country are barred
from bringing actions in tribal court without securing authority to do
business from the Department of Commerce.'
7
'
Safeguards against arbitrary Department of Commerce actions are pro-
vided in section 183 of the Code. These include administrative remedies
which must be exhausted 7 2 and subsequent suits in the tribal courts. 73
The Corporation Code appears to allow suits directly under the Code,
as well as to authorize suits against the Department of Commerce under
the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act. 74 Although the language
of section 183(a) is far from precise, a good argument can be made that
equal protection and due process guarantees may be vindicated in such
suits. 75 Suits against the Department of Commerce1 76 must comply with
the procedural provisions of the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act. 77
As the Preamble notes, the Corporation Code is closely modeled after
the American Bar Association's Model Business Corporation Act, Model
Close Corporation Act, and Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, as well
as state laws on agricultural cooperatives. Interpretation of the Code may
be guided by decisional law construing the model acts and other state
law, while traditions and customs of the Navajo people must also be
considered. 78 The principal impact of the Navajo Nation Corporation
169. Id. § 172. The rulemaking power of the Department of Commerce in this area appears
unfettered by the Tribal Council, but rules must generally be passed on by the Attorney General
and the Economic and Community Development Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council. Id.
§ 165(c). Other rulemaking authority (regarding unincorporated associations) is found in § 168(d).
Regulations were to be promulgated within 180 days of the enactment of the Code. Corporation
Code at Preamble, 4.
170. Corporation Code, supra note 153, § 177(d).
171. Compare id. § 168(b)(1) with § 177(a).
172. Id. § 183(a).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. The section mentions due process explicitly. Due process rights have been held to subsume
generally rights to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316 (1977); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,
644 (1977).
176. Corporation Code, supra note 153, § 183(c).
177. NAVAJO TRm. CODE tit. 1, §§ 351-55 (Supp. 1985).
178. Id. at Preamble, 2. The integration of Navajo custom is mandated generally by NAVAJO
Tram. CODE tit. 7, § 204 (Supp. 1985), but will probably have little practical impact on how the
Code is administered or interpreted.
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Code on most creditors will be the requirements of filing and appointing
a registered agent.
V. PROCEDURES IN THE NAVAJO COURTS
A. Representation in Navajo Tribal Courts
With the exception of natural persons, who may appear pro se, parties
in Navajo Tribal Court actions must be represented by a licensed tribal
court advocate. The judicial branch has delegated to the Navajo Nation
Bar Association ("NNBA") the authority to administer bar examinations
and otherwise pass on the qualifications of those seeking to be admitted
to practice in the courts. The courts, however, maintain ultimate authority
over bar admissions. 79 The establishment of the NNBA and the admission
of attorneys to practice in Navajo courts represents a final departure
from the remains of the court system established by the federal government
for Indian tribes.
Tribal courts had their origin in 1883 when the BIA established "Courts
of Indian Offenses" for the various Indian nations.'90 Although these
courts were intended to alienate traditional leadership, suppress traditional
laws, and hasten the assimilation process then in vogue,' 8' professional
attorneys were barred from practicing in these courts, 8 2 and the Indian
judges did not feel constrained to follow strictly the adversarial Anglo
model. 83 The Navajo judges in particular exhibited some independence
from federal control, continuing to follow Navajo custom in probate
matters and dealing with some criminal matters as boundary disputes to
be decided in the civil context." The Navajo courts developed procedures
for handling property, business, and other civil cases in the 1920's and
1930's.1s1 In 1959, the Navajo Nation assumed complete control of its
courts. 1
86
A remnant of the rules for the Court of Indian Offenses-that pro-
hibiting "professional attorneys" from practicing in the Navajo courts-
was discussed in In re Battles,'87 which determined that Battles, a non-
179. See, e.g., In re The Practice of Law in the Courts of the Navajo Nation, 4 Navajo Rptr.
75, 76 (1983).
180. B. MORSE, INDIAN TIRIAL COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A MODEL FOR CANADA? 9 (1980).
The first Navajo "Court of Indian Offenses" was established in 1903. JUICLi BRANCH OF THE
NAVAJO NATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 ANmUAL RHPORT]. See United States
Dept. of Interior, Annual Report of the Commissions of Indian Affairs 111 (1893).
181. R. BARSCH & J. HENDERSON, Tribal Courts, The Model Code, and the Police Idea in
American Indian Policy, AmmlcAN INDIANS D "TE LAw 25, 34 (1978); JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE
NAvAJO NATION, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 ANNUAL REPORT].
182. See section 8 of the Law and Order Regulations, approved by the Secretary of the Interior
on November 27, 1935, reproduced in Tribal Power-Exclusion of Non-Indian Attorneys, I Op. Sol.
775 (1937); 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 181, at 3.
183. R. BARSCH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 181, at 40.
184. Conn, supra note 43, at 338; R. BARSCH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 181, at 39-42.
185. R. BARSCH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 181, at 41, cited in Preamble to the Rules of the
Navajo Peacemaker Court 4.
186. 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 180, at 2.
187. 3 Navajo Rptr. 92 (1982).
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Indian lay advocate who passed the first Navajo bar examination in 1976,
was not prohibited from representing clients in Navajo courts, in part
because the Tribal Code did not distinguish between Navajo and non-
Navajo lay advocates.
Part III of the NNBA by-laws prescribes the qualifications for admission
to membership. These include the passing of a bar examination admin-
istered by the NNBA, a requirement that the applicant be at least eighteen
years old, educational requirements, 18 and a requirement that the applicant
"be a resident of, or be permanently employed full-time within the lands
subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation for at least thirty (30)
days next preceding the date of the application.' ' 189 Given the unique
status and interests of Indian tribes and their unique ability to exclude
non-members from entering Indian land, 190 the residency requirement is
likely to be held valid, even after Supreme Court of New Hampshire v.
Piper. 91
Advocates in the Navajo courts are held to the American Bar Asso-
ciation ("ABA") ethical standards.192 Notice to the counsel of record in
the Navajo courts (as in most other courts) serves as notice to the client.1 93
Great care should be taken in selecting a legal representative because of
the great differences in training, ability, and competence of the Bar
members. Some members are employed in large firms in Phoenix and
Albuquerque; others are traditional Navajo advocates whose membership
in the NNBA was confirmed prior to the institution of bar examinations;
a few others are non-Navajo non-attorneys who were likewise grand-
fathered into the Bar. It should be emphasized that a lawyer from a
prestigious firm is not necessarily a better choice than a traditional Navajo
advocate.' 94 Often, it is quite the opposite. The traditional advocate will
often be more persuasive with a jury and will have more experience
before a particular judge. Many have been well trained in conjunction
with previous employment in the legal aid programs on the reservation.
The NNBA maintains a roster of persons admitted to practice in the
Navajo courts. Bar examinations are given twice each year.
B. Rules of Procedure
Aside from substantive remedies and procedures adopted by the Navajo
Tribal Council, the investor analyzing the lending environment should
188. Any of four options will satisfy the educational requirements: (a) admission to a state bar;
(b) successful completion of a Bar training course certified by the NNBA; (c) associate membership
for no less than six months; or (d) membership in another Indian tribal Bar whose courts grant
reciprocity to members of the Navajo Bar.
189. By-laws, III.B.I.
190. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982).
191. 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
192. In re Deschinny, 1 Navajo Rptr. 66, 67 (1972).
193. See, e.g., Estate of Wauneka, 6 Navajo Rptr. 140 (1988); Chavez v. Tome, 5 Navajo Rptr.
183, 189 (1987); Tracey v. Heredia, 4 Navajo Rptr. 149, 153 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1983).
194. Creditors should also be aware of the Peacemaker Court, a parallel system for resolving
disputes in more traditional fashions. The Peacemaker Court is not generally intended to be used
in civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $1,500. See infra text part V.D.
Spring 1991]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
consider procedural protections afforded by the tribunal which will decide
his cause of action. In the recent past, procedural provisions were con-
tained generally in a pamphlet published by the Judicial Branch of the
Navajo Nation. In addition, the Navajo Nation Bar Association, for a
nominal fee, distributed a pamphlet of rules of procedure annotated by
Michael Vargon, Esq., of Navajo Community College. The rules were
not nearly as detailed as the rules of procedure of the state or federal
courts. Nonetheless, the courts applied principles of comity to tribal court
procedures. 95
Pursuant to the authority granted in Navajo Tribal Code title 7, section
601, the Navajo tribal courts previously adopted Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rules of Evidence, and Rules of Appellate Procedure.'9 Practitioners
interviewed did not view these rules as impediments to a fair outcome,
although several deficiencies appeared from the reported cases.
For example, rule 4 of the former Rules of Civil Procedure required
the filing of compulsory counterclaims; however, no rule required an
answer to a counterclaim. Thus, in General Electric Credit Corp. v.
Vandever,'9 the counterclaim of a debtor was heard without the issues
being joined in the pleadings. Vandever was cited in Martin v. Tovar,1 9s
which affirmed the dismissal of a counterclaim because the counter-
defendant failed to answer the counterclaim. The opinion is prefaced by
the following statement: "NOTE: This decision has been OVER-
RULED."19
The Begay case identified another shortcoming of the former Navajo
Rules of Civil Procedure: the lack of detailed discovery rules." However,
prior to the adoption of comprehensive rules of civil procedure, the
Navajo Supreme Court upheld a judgment by default on the issue of
liability based on a defendant's willful failure to cooperate in discovery
and to comply with discovery orders.2' The sanction of entry of a default
judgment is reserved for instances of egregious conduct.M
The Navajo judiciary anticipated by several years the new federal rule
allowing service of process by mail, but provisions for service by registered
maiI2s in former rule 3 have become more restrictive than federal and
state rules.2 Although rule 3 appeared to allow, for in personam actions
195. See Smith v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, 783 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986).
196. See Thompson v. Wayne Lovelady's Frontier Ford, I Navajo Rptr. 282, 293 (Shiprock D.
Ct. 1978).
197. 1 Navajo Rptr. 352 (1978).
198. 3 Navajo Rptr. 27 (1980).
199. Id.; see also Becenti v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 2 Navajo Rptr. 21, 22 (Crownpoint D.
Ct. 1979); Four Corners Auto Sales, Inc. v. Begay, 4 Navajo Rptr. 100, 101-02 (1983) (requiring,
prospectively, all counterclaims to be answered).
200. See Four Corners Auto Sales, 4 Navajo Rptr. at 103; Battese v. Battese, 3 Navajo Rptr.
110 (1982).
201. Chavez v. Tome, 5 Navajo Rptr. 183 (1987); see also Four Corners Auto Sales, 4 Navajo
Rptr. at 100.
202. Billie v. Abbott, No. A-CV-34-87, slip op. at 25 (Navajo, Nov. 10, 1988).
203. Service by certified mail satisfied the requirement of former rule 3. Id. at 21.
204. See Thompson, 1 Navajo Rptr. at 295.
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as well as all others, service by publication after the plaintiff attempted
other means of service, the validity of service by publication in in personam
actions was never tested. 205
The Navajo judiciary made minor revisions to its rules of civil procedure
in 1982. The tension between the objective of accessibility to and un-
derstanding of court procedures by litigants and advocates alike, versus
the need for predictable procedures by creditors contemplating significant
financial exposure, made major revisions of court rules by the judiciary
problematic. Nonetheless, the Navajo Supreme Court, on May 22, 1989,
adopted sweeping changes to the rules of civil procedure for the district
courts, such rules becoming effective on July 1, 1989 and applying to
all cases filed on or after July 1, 1989. The new rules closely follow the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is important to be aware of the
deviations from the federal rules even though the federal rules provided
the framework for the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition,
the Navajo rules integrate the requirements of other Navajo law, such
as the Navajo Corporation Code." The new rules also contain features
which may affect the substantive rights of parties.m Matters commonly
treated in local rules are included in the new rules. For example, Rule
10(d) addresses the size of paper, double spacing, and similar matters.
Rule 11 of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure puts an even greater
burden on counsel than the revised rule 11 of the federal rules by not
only "binding" parties to affidavits and exhibits filed by them, but also
requiring counsel to "make an adequate investigation of the facts of an
affidavit to make certain there is an independent review of their con-
tents."2
The Navajo rules contain no provision for amendments of pleadings
to conform to the evidence. Rule 17 of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure
contains much more detail than the comparable federal rule, especially
with respect to guardians ad litem and actions against sureties, assignors
and endorsers.
The reasons for some differences between the Navajo and federal rules
are not readily apparent. For example, rule 22 of the federal rules allows
a defendant to obtain an interpleader "by way of cross-claim or coun-
terclaim." 209 The Navajo rules only authorize a defendant interpleader
"by way of cross-claim. ' 210
Rule 30(i) of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure sets out useful
procedures for taking depositions within the Navajo Nation for use in
actions pending in foreign (i.e., state or federal) jurisdictions.
205. Such an application of the rule could have raised serious due process implications. See, e.g.,
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 796-97 n.3 (1983); Chapman v. Farmers
Ins. Group, 90 N.M. 18, 558 P.2d 1157 (Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d
1347 (1977).
206. See, e.g., NAvAJo R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4), regarding service on corporations doing business within
the Navajo Nation.
207. See, e.g., NAVAJo R. Civ. P. 8(c), 12(i), regarding waiver of affirmative defenses.
208. NAvAJo R. Cirv. P. 11(a)(2).
209. FED. R. Crv. P. 22(1).
210. NAvAjo R. Crv. P. 22(a).
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Of special importance to creditors is the omission in the Navajo rules
of any counterpart to rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, requests for seizure of persons or property (for example, by arrest,
attachment, garnishment, replevin or sequestration) will be decided by
reference to the provisions of the Navajo Tribal Code and by the caselaw
developed in the Navajo courts on these subjects. Similarly, there is no
rule in the Navajo courts regarding receivers. Notable, too, is the omission
of a rule of civil procedure to govern condemnation actions, such as
rule 71A of the federal rules.
In short, the new rules of civil procedure provide much greater certainty
for counsel representing both creditors and debtors. Most of the problems
encountered under the former rules are addressed. Other problems, such
as the absence of procedural rules governing garnishment, could not be
fully remedied because of the substantive law enacted by the Navajo
Tribal Council.
The Navajo Nation's Rules of Evidence are fairly detailed, and the
Navajo Supreme Court apparently considers the Federal Rules of Evidence
in deciding cases in the Navajo judicial system.21 1
In extraordinary circumstances, questions may be certified by the district
courts for consideration by the Navajo Supreme Court. 2 2 Most recently,
the Window Rock District Court certified controlling questions of law
to the Navajo Supreme Court in a case involving the Tribal Council's
actions in placing Chairman MacDonald on "administrative leave" pend-
ing resolution of allegations of receipt of kickbacks and other wrongdoing
by MacDonald. 213
Finally, the Judiciary Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council ap-
proved, on January 9, 1987, the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure
applicable in civil appeals to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court.
C. Special Rules Regarding Possessions
The provisions of Navajo Tribal Code title 7, sections 607-609 regarding
self-help repossessions have little practical effect on transactions not
involving motor vehicles. 21 4 Under the authority of section 601(a) 21 1 which
authorizes the judiciary to "adopt rules of pleading, practice, and pro-
cedure," the judges approved special rules for replevin actions on January
29, 1982. It has been held that Navajo Tribal Code title 7, section 601(a)
encompasses "all necessary rulemaking powers and regulatory authority
''216
211. Navajo Nation v. Murphy, No. A-CR-02-87, slip op. at 10 n.l (Navajo, Apr. 21, 1988).
212. See, e.g., Navajo Housing Auth. v. Betsoi, 5 Navajo Rptr. 5 (1984).
213. Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, No. CV-99-89 (Navajo D. Ct. 1989).
214. See White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay More, 1973 Wis. L.
REV. 503, 513 ("It appears that when one speaks of self-help repossession he is talking mostly of
automobiles.").
215. NAvAJo TIja. CODE tit. 7, § 601(a) (Supp. 1985).
216. In re Battles, 3 Navajo Rptr. 92, 96 (1982) (citing In re Bowman, 2 Navajo Rptr. 27, 28
(1979)).
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The rulemaking was done in the form of a resolution signed by all
of the judges. The "Whereas" portion of the rulemaking is most revealing
about the attitudes of the judges. First, the judges noted that the ap-
plication of sections 607-609 "to non-Indian creditors has been the oc-
casion of a great deal of litigation, most of which has been unnecessary."
Second, the judges made, as a basis for the rulemaking, a policy statement
that extensions of credit by off-reservation creditors are beneficial to the
residents of the Navajo Nation, and, therefore,
[t]he protection of the rights of extenders of credit as to property
used as security and the protection of rights of consumers within the
Navajo Nation requires the courts to adopt a rule of pleading, practice
and procedure with respect to property repossession which is simple,
speedy, and fair.
The Tribal Code requires such rules to be "reviewed by one of the
Tribal attorneys. ' 21 7 The repossession rulemaking was reviewed by the
then-Solicitor to the Navajo Tribal Courts, James W. Zion.
The rules address all actions "whether or not credit was extended
within the Navajo Nation and shall apply in all situations where the
security is located, possessed, garaged, kept, or otherwise found within
the Navajo Nation.' '218 Rule 2 states that anyone seeking to recover
secured property through the Tribal Courts "shall be deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of determining
the rights of all parties to the credit transaction."
The rulemaking establishes an efficient mechanism for recovering se-
cured property. Rule 5 sets forth the requirements of a verified petition,
which may be "informal or drafted by a creditor without counsel, as
long as it substantially complies with this rule.' '219 The petition may
request damages in addition to recovery of the propertyY0
When a petition is filed, the clerk of the court will issue an order to
show cause directing the debtor to appear at a hearing and show "good
legal grounds why the property should not be repossessed.' '221 If the
creditor seeks immediate possession of the property, the court may order
its immediate seizure. 2 A motion under rule 10 must be accompanied
by an "affidavit giving specific facts and reasons" to show an "immediate
and likely danger that the security will be damaged, destroyed, hidden,
removed from the jurisdiction of the court or impared [sic] as a secu-
rity. "22
The hearing must be held between five and ten days from the filing
of the petition. 224 The hearing is to be conducted informally, and the
217. NAVAJO Tam. CODE tit. 7, § 601(c) (Supp. 1985).
218. Navajo Rules Regarding Repossession of Personal Property, Rule 1 (enacted Jan. 29, 1982).
219. Id. Rule 5(a).
220. Id. Rule 5(b)(5).
221. Id. Rule 6(a).
222. Id. Rule 10.
223. Id. Rule 10(a).
224. Id. Rule 7.
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debtor may present defenses or objections to the petition.225 Counterclaims
and set-offs will not be considered at this initial hearing. 226 The court's
order shall issue within twenty-four hours of the conclusion of the
hearing. 227
If set-offs or counterclaims are pleaded against the creditor, the court
shall determine if there is "probable cause" to believe the debtor's
assertions. 228 If there may be a valid claim by the debtor, the court may
impound the secured property pending disposition of the debtor's claims,
allow repossession either upon the posting of a bond or without such a
bond, 229 or allow the debtor to keep the property upon posting of a
bond or payment to the court of an amount equal to the value of the
property or, if the creditor agrees, with timely monthly payments to the
creditor pending disposition of the action.230 Sanctions against both cred-
itors and debtors for failure to comply with the rules are provided in
rule 11.
The rules are plainly intended to reduce costs associated with recovering
secured property under Navajo Tribal Code title 7, section 607.231 Their
validity has apparently not been challenged, but at least four bases for
challenge exist.
First, in light of both the Tribal Council's specific attention to remedies
and the significant alteration of the respective rights of debtors and
creditors under the rulemaking, the judicial branch may well have usurped
authority vested in the Council. That is, the rulemaking may implicate
not "pleading, practice, and procedure," 23 2 but substantive rights. 233 The
bounds of the judiciary's rulemaking authority has not been addressed
by the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation. The largely academic
discussion of rulemaking authority in the federal courts is inconclusive,
even as to purely procedural rules in federal courts. 234 Congress has
required that rules of procedure and evidence prescribed for the federal
courts be submitted to Congress prior to their effective dates. 235
Second, it is questionable whether the Solicitor to the Judiciary is "one
of the Tribal attorneys" as contemplated by Navajo Tribal Code title
225. Id. Rule 8(a).
226. Id. Rule 8(b).
227. Id. Rule 8(c).
228. Id. Rule 9(a).
229. No bond is necessary when the creditor submits to the court's jurisdiction with regard to
the debtor's claims. Id. Rule 9(b)(4).
230. Id. Rule 9(b).
231. These costs can be quite significant. See White, supra note 214, at 503.
232. NAVAo TRIB. CoDE tit. 7, § 601(a) (Supp. 1985).
233. Indeed, the rulemaking addresses the foundational question of the court's jurisdiction in
rules 2 and 9(b)(4).
234. Compare Wigmore, Legislature Has No Power in Procedural Field, 23 ILL. L. REV. 176
(1928), with 4 K. WRIOHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001,
at 28, 28 n.9 (1987). See Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835), holding that the power
of Congress to ordain and establish courts subordinate to the Supreme Court carries with it the
power to prescribe and regulate the modes of proceeding in such courts.
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990); Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, § 1, 87 Stat. 9
(1973).
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7, section 601(c). Section 601 was passed in 1958 when the only attorneys
for the Tribe were those employed as general counsel and responsible
directly to the Navajo Tribal Council. Section 601(c), at the time of its
enactment, was apparently intended to require an independent review of
rules promulgated by the courts. Because the Solicitor to the Judiciary
probably played a significant role in drafting the rules regarding replevin
actions, the policy of an independent review by an attorney responsible
to the Tribal Council was not served by the in-house review.
Third, debtors may assert that the summary procedures violate due
process rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act, 236 by the Navajo
Bill of Rights, 237 or both. It seems unlikely that, if the Navajo courts
reject other challenges to these rules, a judge will rule that the rules
violate fundamental rights of Navajo debtors, because all of the judges
sitting in 1982 subscribed to the resolution adopting the rules.
Fourth, the Tribal Council's adoption of article 9 of the UCC appears
to occupy the entire field regarding procedures on default. Thus, where
a need for detailed procedures in replevin actions may have existed in
1982, no such need justifies the rules at this time.
These rules may or may not be valid. Their principal utility is in
recovery of motor vehicles purchased under a security agreement. Their
promulgation, more importantly, reflects the unanimous view of the Tribal
judges that creditors' rights should be assiduously protected in tribal
courts.
D. The Peacemaker Court
When the Navajo Nation Bar Association was being formed, there was
some debate over which qualifications would be appropriate for admission
into the Bar. Although the Bar (and the Navajo judiciary) did not
ultimately adopt his position, President Zah felt that the Bar Association
should
give tests to people to practice law in the Tribal Courts. One of those
tests would be the ability to speak Navajo .... This is what the states
have done. If I want to practice law in the state of Arizona, they
bring me in and say I've got to have language ability to a certain
level .... Why shouldn't the Navajos do the same thing? We've got
to say, "You've got to understand Navajo common law. You've got
to be able to speak Navajo, because most of your clients are going
to feel more comfortable speaking Navajo, and solving and listening
to these problems in Navajo." '2 3
In response to concerns that the Anglo-style judiciary was inappropriate
for many disputes involving Navajos, who regard the formal procedures
and adversarial style as alien to them and their culture, the judiciary
adopted rules for a Navajo Peacemaker Court in 1982. This court is a
236. 25 U.S.C. § 1301-41 (1983).
237. NAvAJo TR. CODE tit. 1, §§ 1-8 (Supp. 1985).
238. D. VICENTI, THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE 255-56 (Ramah High School Press 1972).
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community-based system modeled after the traditional manner of resolving
disputes among Navajos. 239
The Navajo Peacemaker Court Manual ("Manual") provides a general
overview of the system. Among other things, the Peacemaker Court is
meant for business matters involving $1,500 or less and "any other matter
the District Court judge feels should or can be taken care of in the
Peacemaker Court." Only Indians may be compelled to use the peace-
making process; non-Indians, however, may choose to resolve their dis-
putes using peacemakers. 2"
The Peacemaker Court is intended to mediate disputes.2 2 Lawyers are
not permitted in the process, and traditional law is applied.2 3
Venue for peacemaking proceedings is generally in the Chapter where
the defendant resides. In the case of a non-Indian creditor requesting
peacemaking proceedings, the creditor must fill out a form requesting a
peacemaker. The judge may grant or deny the request.2" The judge, if
the request is granted, may appoint a peacemaker from a list of persons
compiled from selections of peacemakers by Chapters. The party re-
questing the peacemaker must deposit $30 in the court for payment to
the peacemaker.2 5
Peacemakers are selected by their ability to solve problems, their wis-
dom, their knowledge of Navajo tradition and religion, and their rep-
utation for integrity, honesty, and humanity.2 6 The peacemaker is the
modem-day equivalent of the naat'a'anii,2A7 with the added ability to
enforce the results of his mediation efforts by compulsory process, if
necessary. 2" Moreover, the district judges maintain supervisory authority
over the proceedings.2' 9
Peacemakers are bound by canons 1-5 of the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct. 250 Other canons, such as the one which prohibits judges from
participating in a case in which he or she has a close acquaintance with
a party, are not applicable because "[u]nder Navajo custom, it is con-
sidered ridiculous for a judge to not know the parties or to not have
been in their home." 25'
The peacemaker proceedings are designed to be simple, speedy, and
inexpensive. The peacemaker may report back to the district judge that
informal resolution is impossible.2 52 Peacemakers are not allowed to use
239. See generally 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 181, at 2.
240. NAVAJo PEACEMAKER COURT MANUAL at 8 (hereinafter M ,xuAL].
241. Id. at 27.
242. Id. at 9.
243. Id. at 17 (citing NAvAjo TREB. CODE tit. 7, § 204(a)).
244. Id. at 28.
245. Id. at 29.
246. Id. at 20.
247. Id. at 19.
248. Id. at 23, 30 (subpoena power); id. at 30-34 (protective orders); id. at 34-37 (judgments).
249. Id. at 18-19.
250. Id. at 39.
251. Id. at 40.
252. Id. at 25.
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any means of force or to violate rights guaranteed by the Navajo Bill
of Rights. 253 Appeals from judgments of the peacemakers are allowed, 254
and judgments of the peacemakers are to be accorded the same respect
as a district court judgment. 25
Given the effectiveness of the Chapter-based traditional tribal revolving
credit program (as compared with the relative failure of the formal and
centralized BIA/tribal credit programs), a creditor who expects to establish
successful long-term credit relationships in Navajo Indian Country should
consider carefully the use of the Peacemaker Court. Its value and lim-
itations will depend upon the circumstances of each case, of course.
Actions against debtors with traditional beliefs and lifestyles and strong
community ties will probably be more successful and less expensive in
the Peacemaker Court than in the district courts. Community relations
will be enhanced, in addition, and the creditor will gain valuable insights
about the consumer population in general and the credit-worthiness of
individuals in particular.
The creditor who chooses the peacemaker approach cannot do so
successfully without some knowledge of Navajo tradition. A pushy, in-
tolerant, or impatient creditor, or one who seeks to rely heavily on rights
and duties set forth in the documents which establish the creditor-debtor
relationship, will likely not be respected in the peacemaker environment.
On the other hand, a creditor who genuinely seeks to solve the credit
problem with reference to the larger context of the debtor's other prob-
lems, interests, and place in the community, who seeks long-term ac-
ceptance and effectiveness in Navajo Indian Country, and who views the
debtor as judgment proof without the problem-solving and persuasive
talents of a community elder, will be able to protect its interests more
effectively in the Peacemaker Court in many instances.
VI. REMEDIES OF JUDGMENT CREDITORS
A. Remedies Under the Navajo Tribal Code
Remedies of judgment creditors are found in Navajo Tribal Code title
7, sections 701-712. These provisions supplement and effectuate, to some
extent, the remedies provided in the NUCC.
Section 701(a) states that "[i]n all civil cases, judgment shall consist
of an order of the court awarding money damages to be paid to the
injured party, or directing the surrender of certain property to the injured
party, or the performance of some other act for the benefit of the injured
party." Such a judgment is to be considered a lawful debt in probate
proceedings both in tribal courts and before the Department of Interior's
253. NAv~io Tam. CODE tit. 1, §§ 1-8 (Supp. 1985); MANUAL, supra note 240, at 23.
254. MAUAL, supra note 240, at 38.
255. Id.
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Office of Hearings and Appeals (which probates trust property). 2 6 Sat-
isfaction of judgments may be directed, in addition, from individual
Indian money ("IIM") accounts held in trust by the Secretary of the
Interior. 25 7
The Code provides for the issuance of writs of execution. 251 "A judg-
ment creditor may have as many writs of execution as are necessary to
effect collection of the entire amount of the judgment. "259 The Navajo
police will seize and deliver to the court "sufficient unrestricted and
nonexempt 2 ° property to pay the judgment and costs of sale. It may
specify the particular property to be seized." 26
Sale procedures are set forth in Navajo Tribal Code title 7, section
709. The posting of notices and a public sale are both required. 26 2 Navajo
law provides somewhat greater protection for the judgment debtor than
most states in that the property may not be sold for less than its appraised
value. 6 3 Private sales, which may be conducted after unsuccessful public
sales, are also so limited.2"
For "good cause shown" a plaintiff may obtain a writ of execution
prior to judgment. 2 Sales of perishable goods may also precede judg-
ment. 2" The posting of a bond is required to invoke these procedures. 267
As stated earlier, the Tribal Code does not provide for the garnishment
of wages except in cases involving child support. 2" The lack of such a
remedy is considered a significant hindrance in collecting unsecured debts
by practitioners in Navajo Indian Country. Again, as stated earlier, tribal
sovereign immunity and federal Indian law regarding trust property may
erect independent barriers to obtaining adequate remedies in certain cases.
B. Comity and Full Faith and Credit
Because state courts lack jurisdiction over actions by creditors against
Indians concerning transactions in Indian Country, 269 an effective recourse
for creditors will, in many instances, be determined by the ability to
enforce tribal court judgments in state courts. The courts have vacillated
between the doctrines of comity and of full faith and credit when
256. NAvAiJo TRm. CODE tit. 7, § 703 (Supp. 1985).
257. Id. § 704.
258. Id. § 705. The legislative history of section 705, passed in 1956, again reveals that the Council
sought to relieve pressure to extend state jurisdiction onto the reservation by offering the use of
tribal governmental power to assure that creditors' rights were protected.
259. Id.
260. "Unrestricted" property is property not held in trust for the debtor by the United States;
that is, property without federal restrictions on alienation. "Nonexempt" property is that subject
to execution under NAvAJo Tam. CODE title 7, section 711 (Supp. 1985), which provides far fewer
exemptions than state law.
261. NAVAjO TRm. CODE tit. 7, § 706 (Supp. 1985).
262. Id. § 709(a),(c).
263. Id. §§ 709(c), 708.
264. Id. § 710(a),(b).
265. Id. § 712(a).
266. Id. § 712(b).
267. Id.
268. Heredia v. Heredia, 4 Navajo Rptr. 124, 127 (1983).
269. See F. COHEN, supra note 101, at 251 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)).
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considering the degree of recognition to be accorded tribal court judg-
ments. The Arizona and New Mexico courts typify the disagreements on
this issue.
In Jim v. CIT Financial Services Corp.,270 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that Navajo repossession laws27 1 are entitled to full faith and
credit in New Mexico courts because the Navajo Nation is a territory
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1738. The Arizona Court of Appeals
disagreed, holding in Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc. that provisions of the
Navajo 'Tribal Code are to be recognized on comity principles. 272
In Brown, though, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that "Arizona
has fully recognized the validity of Navajo Tribal Court decisions in the
courts of Arizona." '273 Two Arizona cases suggest a trend toward greater
recognition of tribal court judgments in that state.2 74 The first, Begay v.
Miller,271 rejected both the notions of comity and full faith and credit,
while recognizing the validity of a tribal court divorce decree. In the
second, In re Lynch's Estate, 2 6 the court found that "the proceedings
held in the Navajo Tribal Court must be treated the same as proceedings
in a court of another state or foreign country." 277 New Mexico state
district courts have also enforced Navajo tribal court judgments in unre-
ported consumer cases.
The Supreme Court provides significant, but not dispositive, guidance
here. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,271 the Court stated that "[tiribal
courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the
exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and prop-
erty interests of both Indians and non-Indians." 279 In a footnote, the
Court then stated somewhat tentatively that "judgments of tribal courts,
as to matters properly within their jurisdiction, have been regarded in
some circumstances as entitled to full faith and credit in other courts. '" °
In United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe,u' after noting the advancement
of the Cherokee Nation and its "organized judiciary, ' '282 the Court held
that an administrator appointed by the Cherokee probate court was entitled
to the same recognition as one appointed in courts of states or territories
of the United States .283 In Standley v. Roberts,m rights to rentals affecting
270. 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).
271. NAvAjo Tam. CODE tit. 7, §§ 607.09 (Supp. 1985).
272. 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1977).
273. Id. at 198, 571 P.2d at 695.
274. See Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7
N.M.L. R-v. 133, 139-40 (1977).
275. 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950).
276. 92 Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199 (1962).
277. 92 Ariz. at 356, 377 P.2d at 201.
278. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
279. Id. at 65 (footnote omitted).
280. Id. at 65 n.21 (citations omitted).
281. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856).
282. Id. at 102.
283. Id. at 103.
284. 59 F. 836 (8th Cir. 1894), appeal dismissed, 166 U.S. 704 (1896).
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title to lands within the Choctaw Nation were determined by the Choctaw
court. The Eighth Circuit stated that "this court has held that the
judgments of the courts of these nations, in cases within their jurisdiction,
stand on the same footing with those of the courts of the territories of
the Union and are entitled to the same faith and credit."2
Neither Mackey nor Standley concerned disputes between non-Indians
and Indians, although the reasoning of the courts is fully applicable to
causes of action involving Indians and non-Indians alike.M National
Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indiansa suggests that
at least substantial deference will be accorded tribal court judgments in
such actions. In National Farmers Union, the Court, in determining that
federal court subject matter jurisdiction existed to decide whether the
Crow Tribe court retained authority to require non-Indians to submit to
its civil jurisdiction, held that the federal district court should have
dismissed the complaint. 288 The Supreme Court found that a requirement
for the non-Indian litigant to proceed in tribal court would serve several
ends, including "provid[ing] other courts with the benefit of their expertise
in such matters in the event of further judicial review.' "- Notably, the
Court found that the orderly administration of justice in federal courts
"will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal
Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate
relief is addressed. ' 290 The Court explained its thinking when it talked
of "any question concerning appropriate relief"291 it was considering
not the relief ordered by the tribal court, but limits on relief which would
be appropriately granted by the federal court to the litigant challenging
the jurisdiction of the tribal court. 29
The requirement that state courts extend full faith and credit to tribal
court judgments in the context of the Indian Child Welfare Act 293 is a
two-edged sword. On one hand, the requirement has increased state courts'
awareness of tribal courts.29 On the other hand, the requirement ex-
emplifies Congress' failure to consider orders of tribal courts in other
matters. But,
[w]hile the intricacies of this legal argument [regarding full faith and
credit] apparently need more time for resolution, it is clear that tribal
285. Id. at 845 (citations omitted).
286. See also Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d
649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976); In re Red Fox, 23 Or. App. 393, 542 P.2d 918 (1975); Begay v. Miller,
70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950).
287. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 857 (footnote omitted).
290. Id. at 856 (footnote omitted).
291. Id.
292. After Farmers Union, at least one court of appeals has construed quite narrowly the exceptions
to the requirement of exhaustion in trial courts. A & A Concrete v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,
781 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987);
Williams v. Pyramid Lake Paute Tribe, 625 F. Supp. 1457 (D. Nev. 1986).
293. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1983).
294. JusrTcE N INDIAN CotNTRY, supra note 42, at 58.
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court judgments that presently depend upon recognition through com-
ity are sufficiently legitimate to be an acceptable and integral part
of the overall American system of laws. 295
The most authoritative treatise on Indian law notes that if 28 U.S.C.
section 1738 were finally construed to require state courts to accord full
faith and credit to tribal court judgments, tribal courts would be under
a corresponding duty vis-a-vis state court judgments. 29 Indeed, even under
the comity doctrine, the state courts should be expected to consider the
attitudes of tribal courts with respect to state court judgments when
exercising their authority to recognize tribal judgments. 297 The reported
decisions of the Navajo courts should also be examined.
The earliest case concerning this issue, and one cited often, is In re
Chewiwi.29" In Chewiwi, the court of appeals rejected the application of
full faith and credit to a judgment of a court of the Pueblo of Isleta,
but recognized the judgment on the basis of comity. 299 The court held
that Indian tribes were not intended to be included in the scheme es-
tablished in 28 U.S.C. section 1738.m° In Hubbard v. Chinle School
District,30 ' the court held that, while the tribal courts possess the authority
to adjudicate civil actions where the defendant is an arm of a state
government, the tribal court should refrain from exercising such authority
as a matter of comity. The court noted that it would continue to look
at the good will and conduct of the State of Arizona to see if, in future
cases, the tribal courts should defer to state courts in similar actions.
3 °2
Later cases have sustained the jurisdiction of Navajo courts over state
officials. 30 3 The district court in In re Tsosie3°4 held that BIA officials
are required to recognize Navajo court orders by the doctrine of full
faith and credit.305 District Judge (now Chief Justice) Tso, in Frejo v.
Barney,306 cited Chewiwi in denying a motion to set aside a divorce decree
issued by a New Mexico state court. Judge Tso reasoned:
As to the effect to be given the New Mexico decree, the respondent
was quite correct that this court will honor and enforce that decree.
Guardianship of Katherine Denise Chewiwi, 1 Navajo Rptr. 120 (1977).
295. V. Dm .o A & C. LyTu, supra note 48, at 120.
296. F. COHEN, supra note 101, at 385; see Navajo Nation v. District Court for Utah County,
624 F. Supp. 130, 136 (D. Utah 1985).
297. This point is somewhat overstated in AMHEicAN IrDIAN LAWYERS TJ AUNG PROoRA, ISSUES
iN MUTUALirY 9 (1976): "In the case of comity, the tribal/state court relationship depends entirely
upon the flexibility and sensitivity of the jurists involved."
298. 1 Navajo Rptr. 120 (1977).
299. Id. at 125-26.
300. Id.
301. 3 Navajo Rptr. 167 (1982).
302. Id. at 172.
303. See Tracy v. Yazzie, 5 Navajo Rptr. 223 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1986); Billie v. Abbott,
No. A-CV-34-87, slip op. at 25 (Navajo, Nov. 10, 1988) (reversing entry of a default judgment
against Utah official).
304. 3 Navajo Rptr. 182 (Chinle D. Ct. 1981).
305. Id. at 186-87.
306. 3 Navajo Rptr. 237 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1982).
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This court wishes to discourage forum-shopping in a jurisdiction which
is close to us, and therefore not only will the decree be fully enforced
by this court, but it will be modified only upon the same standards
set by the law of New Mexico.
In Anderson Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Chuska Energy and Petroleum
Co.,108 the court refused to give full faith and credit. to an Oklahoma
county court judgment. Applying comity principles, the court declined
to enforce the judgment, finding that the Oklahoma court had not
obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the action.3 9
The American Indian Lawyer Training Program has identified two
"stumbling blocks" to full faith and credit.1 0 The first is the need to
separate tribal politics from the tribal judicial system. The recent abolition
of the Supreme Judicial Council and the appointment of permanentjudges under Navajo Tribal Code title 7, section 252, satisfy this concern,
although the unsuccessful attempt of Chairman MacDonald in 1989 to
install judges on an ad hoc basis to contest his being placed on "ad-
ministrative leave" alarmed at least one bank doing business with a tribal
enterprise. The second "stumbling block" is the lack of appellate review
in most tribal court systems. The Navajo Nation, however, has had
appellate review since 1958.311 Creditors should have no difficulty enforcing
Navajo court judgments in state courts.
VII. PERCEPTIONS OF CONSISTENCY AND FAIRNESS
A. General Concerns
Dealing with procedural and substantive shortcomings of tribal law is
not an overwhelming task, if, indeed, the shortcomings limit prudent
lenders at all. In the writer's opinion, the hesitation of some creditors
to do business within the Navajo Nation results more from subjective
reservations than from objective reality." 2
307. Id. at 238.
308. 4 Navajo Rptr. 187 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1983).
309. Id. at 188. The Window Rock District Court, after stating that "[it is against the Navajo
policy for people to literally breach their contracts," id. at 191, noted that the plaintiff-creditor
would have an opportunity to prove at trial his allegations. Id.
310. JuSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 42, at 58-59.
311. NAVAJO TRiB. CODE tit. 7, § 301-72 (Supp. 1985).
312. As the next section of this report shows, a review of the reported cases strongly suggests
that the subjective fears of bias and inconsistency are unwarranted. Indeed, such fears may well
mirror the lender's recognition of the hostility of state courts and institutions to Indian rights. It
was not until 1962 that Navajo Indians were effectively allowed to vote in New Mexico. Montoya
v. Bolack, 70 N.M. 196, 372 P.2d 387 (1962); see also Allen v. Merrell, 6 Utah 2d 32, 305 P.2d
490 (1956); Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d 456 (1948). See generally F. COHEN, supra
note 101, at. 646, 678. Disparate provisions of services and opportunities to Navajos, as opposed
to non-Indians, is well documented. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CoMMISION ON CrVIL RioHs, THE
NAvAJo NATION: AN AMERIcAN COLONY (1975). See generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1886); F. COHEN, supra note 101, at 163.
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There are "six major problems that demand attention''3 3 in reservation
court systems throughout the United States. These concerns, previously
identified by the National American Indian Court Judges Association,
are:
1. Political pressure from tribal and religious leaders;
2. Lack of judicial training;
3. Lack of staff, administrative organization, and mechanical support;
314
4. Inability to enforce court orders;
5. Relationships with law enforcement; and
6. Relationships with the BIA.
With respect to the first concern, Navajo judges are insulated from
political pressures, as noted above, by Navajo Tribal Code title 7, section
252. In past years, a valid argument could be made that Navajo Tribal
Court judges were kept on probationary status for long periods of time
in order to ensure that they would defer to political expediency. As the
cases in the following section show, this practice, to the extent it was
employed, was ineffective. The historical independence of the Navajo
judiciary is evident," 5 and the Navajo Nation has recently formalized the
separation of powers between the Navajo judiciary and other branches
of the Navajo government. The writer is unaware of any example of
religious leaders attempting to influence a judicial decision in Navajo
courts.
The 1985 Annual Report of the Judicial Branch refers to some of the
training received by tribal judges.1 6 A Judiciary Committee report to the
full Council 17 alluded to further training needed by the judges in civil
cases." The Judiciary Committee stated that it believes it is
imperative that our judges receive good training and that they be
given more assistance in terms of legal personnel with the Judicial
Branch. The committee believes that the number and complexity of
cases which each judge handles require that planning and preparation
be made for placing a law clerk in each judicial district. 19
Of the five district judges and three supreme court justices who hear
most civil matters, two are law school graduates. The Chief Justice and
313. V. DELORiA & C. LYTLE, supra note 48, at 123.
314. For Indian tribes generally, see also AMERICAN INDIAN LAW TAInNo PROGRAM, INDIAN
SELF-DETE INATION AND THE ROLE OF m TRIBAL CourTs 61-115 (1977).
315. See e.g., United States Dept. of the Interior, Report of Survey of Law and Order Conditions
on the Navajo Indian Reservation 17 (Mar. 23, 1942) ("No cases were found wherein there was
any indication that Tribal politics had influenced the action of the court ... On the whole it
appears that the [Navajo] Indian Courts are less subject to outside influences than are the white
courts.").
316. The Judiciary Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council was directed by the Council to
evaluate the training needs of the judges. The Committee made site visits to each courtroom,
reviewed evaluations of judges by Navajo Bar members, and evaluated the training that each judge
had received. The two new probationary judges, the Committee reported, were "in the process of
completing an extensive judicial training course through the National Judicial College in Reno."
Evaluation of the Navajo Tribal Court Judges, Oct. 24, 1985, at 3.
317. NAVAJO TRIBAL CouNca, REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 7 (Sept. 19, 1985).
318. The report of the Committee is included in the 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 180.
319. NAVAJO TRIBAL CoUNCL., REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 7 (Sept. 19, 1985).
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Justice Bluehouse were well-regarded and experienced trial judges prior
to their appointments to the supreme court, and the Chief Justice, prior
to becoming a trial judge, was instrumental in establishing the Navajo
Nation Bar Association and developing tribal law. Certainly, in the area
of criminal law, 312 any lack of judicial training is less serious than in
many state courts.3 2'
The third general problem, lack of staff, administrative organization,
and mechanical support, is not a problem in Navajo courts. As the 1985
Annual Report states, the Navajo courts have a solicitor, law clerks,
clerks and assistant clerks of the courts, legal paraprofessionals, probation
officers, bailiffs, a court administrator, and a fiscal director. Even one
who views Indian courts with hostility recognizes that the Navajo judiciary
has adequate support staff and facilities.3 22
Nor is inability to enforce court 'orders a problem, according to prac-
titioners in the Navajo tribal courts. The difficulty in lender recourse is
not that orders are not enforceable, but that unsecured creditors cannot
obtain orders garnishing wages.
With respect to the final areas of concern, the judges of the Navajo
reservation, unlike those of "smaller reservations,' 323 are not legal advisors
to the police. Such advice is sought from the Navajo Nation Department
of Justice, which employs approximately twenty attorneys. Finally, with
regard to the potential for BIA pressure to be imposed on the Navajo
judiciary, the 1958 enactments of the Tribal Council made the Navajo
judiciary independent from any BIA control.3u
In addition to the reasoned concerns discussed above, other problems
are identified by persons who have done poor research or who harbor
unvarnished racism. 25 For example, in support of his argument that tribal
courts should be abolished, Brakel asserts that Navajo judges are in-
competent and untrained326 and suggests that the "low stature and low
320. Tribal court jurisdiction in criminal matters is plenary, but limited by federal law to cases
where the punishment does not exceed one year imprisonment and/or a $5,000 fine. 25 U.S.C.§ 1302(7) (1983). Jurisdiction over major crimes committed by Indians in Indian Country is concurrent
in that of the federal courts. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1984); United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050 (9th
Cir. 1991); People v. Morgan, 785 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1990) (en banc).
321. See Tsiosdia v. Rainaldi, 89 N.M. 70, 547 P.2d 553 (1976) (New Mexico magistrates need
not be law school graduates).
322. S. BRAKEL, AmEeicAN INDIAN TREAL COURTS, THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 2 (American
Bar Foundation 1978).
323. V. DELORIA & C. LYTLE, supra note 48, at 124.
324. See 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 180, at 2; see also Benally v. John, 4 Navajo Rptr.
39 (1983); In re Tsosie, 3 Navajo Rptr. 182 (1981).
325. See Byrnes, Attorneys Should Practice in Tribal Courts, 2 Tribal Court p.C-40 (1981). Mr.
Brakel's view of Indian tribal autonomy is that it "pretty much amounts to the right to operate
bingo games." Slavin, Tribal Rights, Anglo Rights, STUDENT LAw. 31 (1986). This is hardly the
view of the courts. See, e.g., F. COHEN, supra note 101, at 246-57. Mr. Brakel, for example,
expresses concern over arraignments in Navajo tribal courts, where he says, "the poorer drunks
were fined and jailed, while those with money walked out." S. BEAKEL, supra note 322, at 84.
Court records belie the assumption of Brakel that all Indian criminal cases involve substance abuse.
See 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 181, at 46-47.
326. See S. B.AKEL, supra note 322, at 83, 86-91. Brakel later generalizes tribal judges as
"professionally inadequate ... [and) politically and socially insecure." Id. at 95.
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pay"3 27 of Navajo judges causes high turnover. Brakel offers this final
observation as if this problem were unique to Indian tribes, but surely
it is not.
In 1986, it was reported in a front page newspaper article that New
Mexico's Chief Justice complained that the state's judiciary had to "grovel"
before the state legislature for reasonable pay and that the lack of money
was demoralizing the judiciary.32 The article quoted the Chief Justice as
follows: "It hasn't happened yet, but I see the beginning of things starting
to crumble. 3 29 Former Chief Justice Riordan of the New Mexico Supreme
Court has noted that low pay contributes to a yearly employee turnover
rate of thirty percent or more.3 0 Indeed, former Chief Justice Burger
identified the low pay for federal judges as a significant problem, and
Congress responded by increasing salaries of federal judges. Certainly,
no one would argue that state or federal courts should be abolished
because of the low pay or perceived low stature of their judges.
Brakel also reports "indications" that the Navajo Nation Bar Asso-
ciation uses bar examinations to keep out "white professionals." 33' To
the contrary, trained attorneys have experienced little difficulty in passing
the examinations; the concern now is that talented traditional advocates
will be excluded. The court of appeals, moreover, has maintained its
ultimate authority over bar admissions.
332
In addition, Brakel expresses concern over "summary justice," with
"high rates for guilty-pleas, convictions, and winning plaintiffs."33 Of
the two civil cases Brakel viewed in his nine days on the Navajo res-
ervation, both were resolved by stipulation.334 Brakel states these obser-
vations as if they are alarming, but he offers no comparisons of the
proportion of similar criminal cases resolved by guilty pleas in state or
federal courts. The fact that both of the civil cases were settled by consent
undermines Brakel's later assertion that the "so-called traditional goals
of mediation and harmony do not appear to weigh in the routine thoughts
and actions of the tribal judges, the parties before the tribal courts, or
the reservation residents." '335
Had Brakel compared the tribal courts with the state courts, he would
have found the comparison more than favorable in many instances.
Arraignments in state courts are hardly impressive. A front page newspaper
article described one arraignment session in state court. After Judge Jones
327. Compare AMERIcAN INDIAN LAW TRAINING PROGRAM, INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE
ROLE OF TRIBAL COURTS 100 (1977) (64% of all tribal judges surveyed felt that the tribal courts
were receiving adequate financial support).
328. Albuquerque J., Jan. 20, 1986, at A-I.
329. Id.
330. Albuquerque J., Dec. 31, 1985, at B-3.
331. S. BRAKEL, supra note 322, at 83.
332. See, e.g., In re Elkins, 4 Navajo Rptr. 63 (1983); In re The Practice of Law in the Courts
of the Navajo Nation, 4 Navajo Rptr. 75 (1983).
333. S. BaKEL, supra note 322, at 83.
334. Id. at 84.
335. Id. at 97.
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asked the public defender, one Ms. Chavez, what the defendant would
plead, the following occurred.
"You tell me judge," she reportedly replied. "You've been entering
all the pleas, you might as well enter this one."
Jones, who was elected last year and took office Jan. 4, appeared
outraged.
"Get out," the witness said Jones shouted at Ms. Chavez. And
when the attorney did not move quickly enough, Jones turned to a
court officer and shouted, "Get her butt out of here," a witness
said.
After Ms. Chavez left the courtroom, Jones apparently continued
conducting arraignments, although none of the approximately 15 per-
sons arraigned by him was allowed to consult with an attorney.
Another witness, who has agreed to give a formal statement for
the Supreme Court, said Jones was making defendants sign waivers
of representation without informing them of what other rights they
were losing by doing so.
"I saw him order the clerk to have three or four persons sign the
waiver. Judge Jones didn't explain to them what that means. Then
he accepted their pleas and sentenced them," the witness said. 336
Brakel was identified as a Research Attorney at the American Bar
Foundation of Chicago, Illinois. Suffice it to say that never in the history
of the Navajo judiciary has there been any scandal such as that uncovered
in Operation Greylord, where attorneys and judges in Chicago routinely
bought and sold justice.3 37 In sum, the only thing the Navajo judiciary
needs to improve its performance is continuing legal education. This need
is readily acknowledged by the judicial branch and is being addressed
adequately. 311
B. Illustrative Cases
That the Navajo Tribe may lawfully exercise jurisdiction over non-
Indians doing business in Navajo Indian Country is accepted in both
federal339 and tribal courts.34 The tribal courts apply a "minimum con-
tacts" test to determine if the assertion of jurisdiction over a non-Indian
defendant is proper. 34'
336. Albuquerque J., Dec. 10, 1985, at A-I.
337. See Albuquerque J., Feb. 19, 1986, at D-10.
338. See 1988 ANbuAL REPORT, supra note 181, at 6, 68-73.
339. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. NavajoIndian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984); Navajo Tribe ofIndians v. Orlando Helicopter Airways, Inc., I Navajo Rptr. 40 (1972); Deal v. Blatchford, 3
Navajo Rptr. 159 (1982).
340. NAvAJo TRm. CODE tit. 7, § 253(2) (Supp. 1985) gives Navajo district courts original juris-diction over [a]IU civil actions in which the defendant is a resident of Navajo Indian Country, orhas caused an action to occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation." Id.341. Billie v. Abbott, No. A-CV-34-87, slip op. at 19-20 (Navajo, Nov. 10, 1988); Sandoval v.Tinian, Inc., 5 Navajo Rptr. 215 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1986); see also Navajo Tribe v. OrlandoHelicopter Airways, Inc., 1 Navajo Rptr. 40, 43 (1972); Peterson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 2Navajo Rptr. 36 (Crownpoint D. Ct. 1979); Thompson v. Wayne Lovelady's Frontier Ford, 1
Navajo Rptr. 282, 288 (Shiprock D. Ct. 1978).
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The preceding parts of this report have discussed actions brought by
non-Indian creditors and the attitude of the tribal courts that, as a matter
of public policy, the extension of credit by non-Indian lenders should
be encouraged. Non-Indian creditors have fared well in Navajo tribal
courts in these consumer actions. But these actions, it can be argued,
do not impact the Navajo treasury or the Navajo political environment.
What might a creditor expect in such a situation?
The most instructive reported decision concerning a case of economic
significance to the Navajo Nation is Howard Dana & Associates v. Navajo
Housing Authority.3 42 In Dana, the district court entered judgment in
the amount of $104,864.14 against the Authority. Over a dissent which
argued that the plaintiff knew or should have been held to know of
federal regulations requiring HUD approval of one of the two architectural
contracts at issue, the court affirmed an award of $91,242.14 in con-
sequential damages to the plaintiff. The court excoriated the Executive
Director of the Authority, Pat Chee Miller. However, nine years later,
the Navajo Supreme Court, reversing the district court, held that while
the judgment was valid, the Authority had not waived its immunity from
levy and execution. 343
Navajo Tribal Code title 7, section 653 provides that "any Navajo
Indian over the age of 21 years, of at least ordinary intelligence, and
not under judicial restraint, shall be eligible to be a juror." The court
of appeals struck down this Tribal Council action, holding that non-
Indians are eligible to be jurors in Navajo courts. 34
In other reported cases of significance, the Navajo judiciary has ruled
against the Tribal Council and its Chairman.3 45 In Halona v. MacDonald,
the court stated:
Our right to pass upon the legality or meaning of these actions
has been questioned in certain places but never by the Council or its
Chairman. That is because they have a traditional and abiding respect
for the impartial adjudicatory process. When all have been heard and
the decision is made, it is respected. This has been the Navajo way
since before the time of the present judicial system. The Navajo
People did not learn this principle from the white man. They have
carried it with them through history. 346
In a highly-charged political controversy, the court in Deswood v.
Navajo Board of Election Supervisors-7 reversed a determination of the
Board of Election Supervisors that an anti-administration candidate did
342. 1 Navajo Rptr. 325 (1978).
343. Navajo Housing Auth. v. Howard Dana & Associates, 5 Navajo Rptr. 157 (1987) (citing
NAvAjo TRm. CODE tit. 6, § 623).
344. George v. Navajo Tribe, 2 Navajo Rptr. 1 (1979).
345. See Dennison v. Tucson Gas and Elec. Co., 1 Navajo Rptr. 95 (1974); Halona v. MacDonald,
1 Navajo Rptr. 189 (1978) (affirming an injunction prohibiting the former Chairman and the tribal
comptroller from expending funds appropriated by the Tribal Council to pay for the Chairman's
legal expenses).
346. Halona, 1 Navajo Rptr. at 205.
347. 1 Navajo Rptr. 306 (1978).
Spring 1991]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
not qualify to be placed on the ballot. The case was decided after the
MacDonald administration instituted the now-defunct Supreme Judicial
Council, which had overruled a court of appeals decision in a similar
case, Benally v. Lancer.34 The court of appeals, although stating that
it would "abide by the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Council where
it is possible to understand them, ' 349 again reversed the Board of Election
Supervisors and allowed the candidate to run for office.
The most significant political cause of action in the reported cases is
Yazzie v. Board of Election Supervisors.350 In Yazzie, the court of appeals
rejected an apportionment plan adopted by the Tribal Council, stating
that "[t]he reapportionment plan adopted by the Council may have
satisfied minimum federal requirements but in no way did it satisfy the
unique requirements of the Navajo electorate." ' 351
As a result of the Yazzie and Halona decisions, two judges, Merwin
Lynch and Charlie John, were ultimately forced off the Bench. Later,
Peterson Zah campaigned successfully on a platform seeking to separate
tribal politics from the tribal judicial system.3 52 The accomplishment of
this objective by the formal abolition of the "Supreme Judicial Council"
and the recent appointments of permanent judges under the Navajo Tribal
Code has removed the second of the two "stumbling blocks" to full
faith and credit which exist for many tribes.353 Moreover, none of the
reported cases suggest that any of the trial judges have succumbed to
political pressure. The principled decisions in the Tome cases354 and those
in 1989 involving the Tribal Council's placement of Chairman MacDonald
on "administrative leave" are the most recent examples of this fact.355
In sum, the concern of some that Navajo courts may not be fair and
impartial when considering claims of non-Indian creditors is not supported
by any objective standard.
C. Recent Developments
The Navajo judiciary has the unenviable task of dispensing justice in
a spectrum of legal disputes ranging from customary grazing rights, where
proceedings may be held in the Navajo language, to debtor-creditor
problems, which may require a sophisticated analysis of federal Indian
law or procedural issues. Recent appointments to the Navajo judiciary
348. 1 Navajo Rptr. 312 (1978).
349. Deswood, I Navajo Rptr. at 308.
350. 1 Navajo Rptr. 213 (1978).
351. Id. at 217.
352. See JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 42, at 59.
353. Id. at 58. The Navajo Nation has had appellate review (identified as a second "stumbling
block") since 1958. NAVAJO TRiB. CODE tit. 7, § 301-72 (Supp. 1985).
354. The first of the opinions is reported as Tome v. Navajo Nation, 4 Navajo Rptr. 159 (Window
Rock D. Ct. 1983).
355. In July 1990, the Independent Judicial Review Task Force published its evaluation of the
Navajo courts, concluding that "the Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation provides a firm illustration
of effective administration of justice .... This Task Force has been impressed by this commitment
and dedication to integrity and independence in decision making and the administration of justice."
The members of the Task Force were Hon. Carl A. Muecke, Senior United States District Judge
for the District of Arizona; Hon. William Thorne, Jr., Utah State Court Judge, Salt Lake City;
and Lawrence M. Hyde, Associate Dean, National Judicial College, Reno, Nevada.
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show the Navajo Nation's recognition of the need to address issues arising
in such commercial transactions.
The appointment of Raymond Austin to the Navajo Supreme Court
is one example. Austin, a graduate of the University of New Mexico
Law School, was a law clerk for former Chief Justice Payne of the New
Mexico Supreme Court. Justice Payne highly praises Austin. A second
example is the appointment of Robert Yazzie as Window Rock District
Judge. Yazzie also graduated from the University of New Mexico Law
School. Yazzie was recently commended by former Chief Judge Howard
Bratton of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
for Yazzie's efforts in completing a Navajo-English glossary for use in
federal courts. Other recent appointments, including the elevation of
Judge Tso to Chief Justice of the Navajo Supreme Court, show that the
Navajo judiciary can function properly not only in typical debtor-creditor
disputes, but also in disputes between tribal members requiring an un-
derstanding of Navajo common law and the Navajo language. Navajo
judges, like their non-Indian counterparts, have regularly augmented their
legal knowledge and abilities with continuing legal education programs
sponsored by a variety of institutions, including the National American
Indian Court Judges Association and the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration.116
VIII. CONCLUSION
Lender recourse in Navajo Indian Country is, as a matter of Navajo
substantive law, public policy, and judicial interpretation, adequate for
most secured creditors. For others, the addition of garnishment provisions
for commercial transactions should provide significant lender assurance.
Lender recourse in transactions involving the Navajo Nation or its en-
terprises must be examined on a deal-by-deal basis, with special emphasis
on provisions to satisfy lender insecurity based upon the Nation's sovereign
immunity and the trust status of its most significant assets.
With respect to procedural protection, the former shortcomings of the
Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure have been remedied by new rules effective
July 1, 1989. However, more timely publication and dissemination of
supplements to the published Navajo Tribal Code, the rules of civil and
appellate procedure, and the Navajo Reporter would generally increase
creditor confidence about the substantive law and the manner in which
creditors' rights are enforced in Navajo courts.
Favoritism based either on tribal politics or on the race of the litigants
has not been experienced. Indeed, the Navajo courts have consciously
encouraged lending to Navajos, and there is no indication of a change
in this policy.
356. See V. DELoRLA & C. Lyriu, supra note 48, at 123.
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In addition to the standard information required by lenders of debtors,
knowledge of the background of the Navajo government and the traditions
of its people, along with the addition of the Navajo Tribal Code, the
Navajo Rules of Court, the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
Navajo Reporter to the libraries of creditors' attorneys, is necessary to
make prudent lending decisions. The institutional climate for lending in
Navajo Indian Country is more than acceptable and, with the recent
strengthening of the Navajo judiciary, it is likely to stay that way.
